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Abstract 
This study was conducted in Norway and Uganda. The objective was to 
investigate the carbon forestry markets using Green Resources AS as an example. 
Green Resources is an interesting case because it is one of the largest companies 
engaged in carbon forestry at the African continent.  
 
The main problem discussed in the thesis is: What are the challenges of forestry 
carbon markets, and are they reflected in Green Resources’ projects in Uganda? 
By using features from neoliberalism and institutionalism, I explain why forest 
carbon markets have been more successful in the voluntary than in the compliance 
market. I also look at the forest carbon market’s challenges with concern to prices 
and certifications, in addition to some of the perceived benefits and challenges 
such projects face. The last section of the analysis focuses on Green Resources’ 
plantations in Uganda and serves as an example of some of the challenges carbon 
forestry projects face “on the ground”. Different institutional arrangements 
influence GRAS projects and are believed to have an impact their business 
strategy.  
 
In order for the reader to grasp the background for the creation of carbon markets, 
additionally to which markets that exist and how they function, a thorough 
presentation is given in the parts before the methodology chapter. Neoliberal 
theory provides the basic understanding for why a market solution to the climate 
problem was chosen. Central features in market creation are property rights and 
commodification of the carbon credits.  
 
The methodology used in this thesis is qualitative and based on interviews, 
literature review, various reports and observation. 
 
The results from the study show that policy processes by and large influence the 
market as new institutionalism emphasize. Also features from neoliberalism and 
critical institutionalism explain the actual results we see in the carbon markets 
today. Green Resources face typical challenges in carbon forestry markets. With 
regards to socio-economic impact and sustainability of their projects, my findings 
indicate that Kachung plantation operating in the compliance market is doing 
better than Bukelaba operating in the regulatory.  
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 1.0 Introduction 
Carbon markets represent a relatively new creation that was invented in the light 
of the increased focus on climate change policies. They were an important part of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
its Kyoto Protocol. The background for the Kyoto negotiations was the first 
Assessment Report on climate change published by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990. IPCC regularly publish reports on the 
development on climate change, and the main message of the IPCC 2007 report 
was that the existence of warming of the climate system is crystal clear. Further, 
that increased temperatures since mid-20
th
 century stems from anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas concentrations (IPCC 2007).  
 
There are many perspectives on the creation of these markets. They can be seen as 
politically constructed, and prevailing literature mainly focus on three 
explanations for the success of carbon markets as a policy instrument (Paterson 
2011). The first is that they became a key in the Kyoto protocol as a consequence 
of US’ practice of pursuing their own political interests, and a desire of the other 
nations to find a solution that the US was able to ratify. The second focuses on 
flexibility. Many states, in particular those with a perception of high emission 
reducing costs, such as the US and Norway, wanted to meet their obligations to 
the Kyoto Protocol by investing in reduction of climate gases abroad. The last 
point is efficiency, as some actors wanted to find solutions to reduce emissions 
that are as cheap as possible, and that equalize marginal reduction costs across all 
actors (ibid).  
 
Carbon trading is an intricate system with the simple goal of making it cheaper for 
companies and governments to reduce their emissions. Generally, carbon trade 
exists in two forms: “cap and trade” and “offsetting.” Under the cap and trade-
system intergovernmental bodies and governments hand out licenses to pollute to 
different industries. Instead of reducing its own emission, a company can trade 
their permits with others who more cheaply can reduce their emissions. Carbon 
offsets is financial support to emission saving projects, such as hydroelectric 
power stations and development of forestry projects. The UN-administered Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) is part of this scheme (Gilbertson and Reyes 
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2009). Even though offsets tend to be presented as emission reductions, they do 
not reduce pollution per se. The reason is that they do not directly contribute to 
lower emission rates when the projects are initiated and launched
1
. They do, 
however, aim to contribute to development of cleaner projects in countries in the 
southern hemisphere that would not exist without such support. Therefore, one 
may assume that it reduces future emissions from developing countries. One 
criticism of these projects is that pollution keeps the same levels in the northern 
countries, while the global south possibly takes the costs socially and 
environmentally. On top of that, some argue that the real CO2-reductions are non-
existing.  
 
Alongside the regulatory markets, you find voluntary offsets. These offsets give 
consumers and companies a chance to gain better conscience and market 
themselves as “green”.  Voluntary markets face many of the same problems as the 
regulatory. Additionally, they are criticized for:  
 
“individualizing the response to climate change, distilling the complexities of how 
energy is produced and used, and how land is distributed, into a seemingly simple 
question of authorizing a small payment with a click on the computer mouse.” 
(Gilbertson and Reyes 2009, 12) 
  
With the development of carbon markets, several ways to engage in carbon 
capturing have emerged. Afforestation and reforestation is one of them, and even 
though carbon markets are highly criticized, there exist several advantages with 
these projects. Among these advantages may be decreased erosion, increased 
rainfalls
2
 and preservation of natural forests. Preservation of natural forests may 
happen due to forest plantation activity because it may change the use of natural 
forests to plantation forest products. Forest carbon markets have recently been 
subject to volatile price changes
3
 and increased focus on third-party certification 
of projects. The Norwegian company Green Resources AS is an example of a 
                                                 
1
 This may change in the long run as new environmentally friendly projects can 
outdo more environmentally harmful projects.  
2
 This point is very controversial, but some claim it is an actual benefit, despite 
the difficulties that exist in proving this statement.  
3
 With regards to prices, all carbon markets have been affected by a slowdown in 
demand and oversupply of carbon credits. 
GRA 19003 - Master Thesis  02.09.2013 
Page 3 
foreign company that engages in the carbon forestry market. The company has 
acquired land in Eastern Africa to commit to this activity alongside commercial 
wood production. Their aim is to achieve the highest standards within both the 
voluntary and the regulatory market. Additionally, they commit to the highly 
recognized standards of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).  
 
The work of Green Resources is based on an institutionalized market system 
influenced and formed by governments, commercial actors, intergovernmental 
organizations and non-governmental organizations. Per se, most forestry 
businesses operate within the voluntary market. Green Resources has managed to 
gain CDM certification for their plantation in Kachung in Uganda. Their other 
plantation in Uganda, Bukaleba, achieved the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) 
in 2012 (Green Resources 2012). The voluntary market tends to be more criticized 
than the regulatory because it lacks an overall agreement about standards and 
regulations.  
 
1.1 Aim of the Study 
The overall aim of this study is to investigate institutional benefits and 
weaknesses in the forestry carbon markets in relation to how carbon markets 
work. Green Resources’ projects in Uganda will be used as examples of a carbon 
forestry projects. During February/March 2013 I conducted fieldwork for this 
master thesis visiting the plantations researched, in addition to different 
institutions and NGOs relevant for my project. I spent three days in Bukaleba and 
two days in Kachung. The rest of the time was spent at various institutions in 
Kampala. After I returned to Norway I continued visiting relevant actors, 
researchers and NGOs with knowledge of the company and carbon markets. An 
important aspect is to look into how the carbon market got institutionalized 
politically and economically, and look into the challenges such projects face. 
Neoliberal and institutional theories are used to explain this invention. Property 
rights are seen as important and are therefore discussed. I look at the 
preconditions for how a market is built and how the different standards play out 
their role. With regards to different standards I compare the two plantations in 
Uganda because of their achievements of different standards.  
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A study of the carbon markets is interesting because carbon trade have grown into 
the largest environmental market in the world. These markets now trade for more 
than 100 billion US Dollars yearly, and are expected to challenge the derivatives 
market, which is currently the world’s largest financial market, within a decade 
(Lohmann 2009).  The case study is interesting because Green Resources is a 
large actor within the carbon forestry market. They have solid support from the 
Norwegian government in regards of funding/loans. The Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance signed a big contract with the company to buy climate quotas, but had to 
go back on the deal in the fall 2012. The reason was that GR did not get the CDM 
approval in time. Additionally, Norway as a country is one of the main 
contributors to carbon forestry projects and is highly involved in the REDD+ 
process.  
 
1.2 Problem Definition and Research Questions 
The main problem discussed in the thesis is: 
 
What are the challenges of forestry carbon markets, and are they reflected in 
Green Resources’ projects in Uganda? 
 
The analysis more specifically aims to answer the following questions:  
1. Why has carbon forestry projects been more successful in voluntary than 
regulatory carbon markets?  
2. What influence prices in the two markets? Are there any differences 
between the voluntary and regulatory markets? 
3. What role do certifications play in voluntary and compliance carbon 
markets?  
4. What socio-economic influence can carbon forestry projects have on local 
populations? Do other institutional arrangements influence how a carbon 
forestry company works? 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven main parts. The first chapter after the introduction 
presents Green Resources, the company used as a case and example throughout 
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the thesis. More specifically, an overview of the company’s background, 
shareholders and economic contributors, and goals and objectives are given. After 
this, the company’s two plantations in Uganda are presented. The next part 
presents the carbon economy and the emergence of carbon markets. Six 
subsections in this part focus on global warming, climate change and forestry, the 
emergence of carbon markets and a presentation of the voluntary and regulatory 
carbon markets. Last is a presentation of how the market works in practice. The 
chapter after this presents the theoretical framework of the thesis, neoliberalism 
and institutionalism. Next is a country profile of Uganda. The chapter gives an 
introduction to why forestry is important for the country and look at factors 
influencing carbon forestry projects in the country. Chapter 6 outlines the 
methodology used in my research project, before an analysis of the material is 
presented in chapter 7.  
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2.0 Green Resources 
This chapter presents Green Resources’ history, shareholders and economic 
contributors, and goals and objectives. After this brief introduction to the 
company, their two plantations in Uganda are presented. In this presentation, the 
certifications related to the forestry carbon market are introduced. Their role in the 
carbon markets will be discussed in the chapter about the carbon economy and the 
emergence of carbon markets.  
 
2.1 Background 
Green Resources is a forest plantation, carbon offset, renewable energy and forest 
products company. It was established in 1995 by Mads Asprem, the current CEO, 
under the name Fjordgløtt AS (Molberg 2012). The company got renamed to Tree 
Farms in 2000 before it changed to the current one in 2007 (Gaarder 2009). 
Asprem was formerly the chief executive of analysis for the forestry business in 
the investment banks Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley (Langberg 2012). He 
wanted to form a company in the forestry business, and based on his knowledge 
he estimated that Eastern Africa was the best location in the world for conducting 
this business due to land availability, low labor costs, stability of governments, 
good rainfall and long traditions of Nordic development aid (Green Resources 
2011a).  
 
2.2 Shareholders and Economic Contributors 
The first forest was planted one year after the start-up in Bukaleba Central Forest 
Reserve in Uganda, and Asprem used his own and friends’ savings to establish the 
business. Since the start, many investors have contributed with 700 million 
Norwegian Kroner (NOK), or equivalent to approximately 125 million USD 
(Langberg 2012). Among the investors you find Storebrand ASA, Steinerud AS, 
New Africa Ltd, Phaunos Timber Fund Plc. (Green Resources 2011b), and the 
well-known Norwegian investor Kjell Inge Røkke (NTBtekst 2012). Green 
Resources have received funding from Norad to some of their community 
activities. Close to Bukaleba they have contributed in building a health center, in 
addition to a HIV/AIDS prevention project in Mayuge district. The company has 
also been granted loans from the Norwegian government agency Norfund 
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amounting 42,3 million NOK (Norfund 2011). The last loan GR got from Norfund 
was given in cooperation with Finnfund (Finland). The amount they got was in 
total US$25 million, and it is supposed to be paid back within six years (Bjergene 
2012). The company has grown into the largest forestry operation in Africa 
covering 14,000 ha under production and 610,000 ha under development (Nel and 
Hill 2013).  
 
2.3 Goals and Objectives  
The company states that their objective is to be “Africa’s best and the world’s 
lowest cost, forest and carbon credit company” (Green Resources 2011c). Their 
targets are to generate great returns to their shareholders, offer their workers 
challenges and outstanding working conditions, to protect the environment, and 
conservation and development of the local communities where they have 
plantations. They want to become a leading company within the carbon offset- 
and energy business. Furthermore, they will absorb and store the maximum 
amount of CO2 through forestation ventures and by transforming plantation 
forests into renewable energy (Green Resources 2011c). Their carbon markets 
initiative stems from tree planting, bio-energy and to manufacturing of wood 
products. Financial turbulence in 2007/2008, continuing today with the Euro 
crisis, has significantly lowered the profitability of carbon markets. GRAS has, 
however, sold their credits during the last years and have had an income of one 
billion dollar stemming from these credits (Bjergene 2012). The CDM credits 
generated from the plantation in Kachung are sold to the Swedish Energy Agency, 
VCS from Mwenga in Tanzania is sold to the CarbonNeutral Company (Green 
Resources 2012). Parts of the revenue from these sales are supposed to go back to 
the local communities surrounding the company’s many plantations.  
 
GRAS use a win-win narrative including environmental, developmental and 
economic benefits, often used in what may be considered as a new and green 
neoliberal approach. As mentioned above, GRAS has grown large, and they 
currently have plantations is South Sudan, Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda. 
The land areas leased by the company cover more than 1000 km
2
 (about the same 
size as Hong Kong), and they have planted forests on about one fourth of the area 
today. The goal is to plant about half the area within a couple of years. The 
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company employs around 4000 employees, mostly hired in Africa, and 3000 as 
seasonal workers (Langberg 2012).  
 
For the purpose of this study, I have focused on Green Resources’ two plantations 
in Uganda: Bukaleba and Kachung. GRAS’ subsidiaries in Uganda, Busoga 
Forestry Company (BFC) and Lango Forestry Company (LFC) manage them. 
Formerly, Green Resources operated under different names, but chose to rename 
the plantations into local names. The renaming of the plantations may have been a 
strategic move so that the local populations could more easily identify with the 
company and their plantations.  
 
2.4 Green Resources in Uganda 
Green Resources has two plantations in Uganda. Both are running operations, and 
according to the manager in Uganda there are currently no plans of expanding the 
operations further
4
. The plantation land is leased from a Ugandan government 
agency, National Forestry Authority (NFA), on a 50-year lease. Generally, NFA 
operates with lease contracts where you pay for the actual planted land, making 
the payments rise as the plantation grows. Bukaleba and Kachung are both carbon 
forestry projects, and are being played out in the complex and weakened 
environmental sector in Uganda. The areas where the plantations are located are 
characterized by rapid deforestation. The annual deforestation in the country is 
estimated to 1.9%, leading to a loss of 90.000 ha of forests per year (National 
Forestry Authority 2009).  
 
2.4.1 The Bukaleba Plantation  
The Bukaleba forest is located alongside Lake Victoria in Mayuge district, 120 
kilometers east from Kampala, the capital of Uganda, and 40 kilometers from the 
industrial center in Jinja. The total area is 9,165 hectares, and approximately 4500 
are seen as plantable. The rest are set aside for conservation, infrastructure, and 
500 ha for community land and a riparian buffer zone. By 2012 the plantation was 
                                                 
4
 GRAS has chosen not to expand their operations in Uganda because available 
land areas have been subject to conflict (interview Isaac Kapalaga, 13.02.2013).  
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4,182 hectares large, and is managed by a subsidiary of GR, Busoga Forestry 
Company (BFC) (Green Resources 2012).  
 
Figure 1: Map showing the location of Bukaleba Forest Reserve
5
 
 
Source: Google.com 
 
The plantation consists mainly of two types of trees accountable for 96% of the 
plantation (Green Resources 2011d). Seventy-eight percent of the area is planted 
with pinus carribea, also known as Caribbean pine. The tropical pine is fast 
growing (James Cook University 2013), and is exotic in Uganda as its natural 
habitat is in the Caribbean and southern America (World Agroforestry Centre 
2013). The pines are grown for sawlog with 20-year rotations (Green Resources 
2011d). Eighteen percent of the area is covered with eucalyptus grandis. The 
species is native in Australia, and therefore imported artificially to Uganda. The 
three is fast growing, large, and known to be one of the most productive plantation 
eucalyptuses (Florabank 2013). In Green Resources’ plantations it is grown for 
utility poles on 10-12 year rotations (Green Resources 2011d). The last 4% are 
indigenous hard woods (Green Resources 2012).  The average altitude of the 
plantation is 1,100 meters with fertile soil conditions. The average temperature is 
23 degrees Celsius, and the average rainfall is 1,250 mm per year with two rainy 
seasons from March-May and September-November (Green Resources 2011d). 
                                                 
5
 The red circle shows the approximate location of Bukaleba CFR. 
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2.4.2 Scholarship Program 
BFC joined a scholarship program financed by the European Union and the 
Sawlog Production Grant Scheme (SPGS) in 2004 (Green Resources 2011d). The 
SPGS is an action taken by the Government of Uganda’s Ministry of Water and 
Environment, and is based on a public-private cooperation. Both the EU and the 
Norwegian Government used to fund it, but due to a corruption scandal in the 
government and expiration of the contract, Norway decided to withdraw its 
funding in the fall of 2012. SPGS is managed by a Steering Committee that 
consist of representatives from the Government of Uganda and different 
development partners (SPGS 2009). The program includes extensive training and 
grants covering 50% of the planting expenses for 1,000 hectares of Green 
Resources’ forests in Kachung and Bukaleba.  
 
2.4.3 Certifications 
GRAS has managed to obtain two high standard certifications on their plantation 
in Bukaleba. It became certified under the Forest Stewardship Council in April 
2011 (Green Resources 2012). In addition, the carbon credits from the 2134 
hectares of the plantation got certified with Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) 
(Nel and Hill 2013). The credits are not yet sold, but the volume available is 
25,350 VCUs. The project is expected to deliver 100,000 tCO2e in the period 
2012-2015 (Green Resources 2012). The Bukaleba plantation has not got approval 
of A/R CDM and the Climate, Conservation and Biodiversity Alliance (CCB) 
standard. Because the planting in Bukaleba started before 1999, the plantation 
cannot get the CDM certification. It should be possible to obtain the CCB 
Standard, and this certification is even promoted to complement the Voluntary 
Carbon Standard that Green Resources has obtained. It is uncertain whether the 
company has tried to get this certification, but informants expressed that this 
failure was caused by failure to demonstrate sufficient net social benefits. 
Bukaleba Central Forest Reserve (CFR) has by NFA a defined encroachment level 
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6
 of 49,67%. Four villages are located within and in the buffer zone of the forest 
reserve. I visited Nakalanga, Bukaleba and Walumbe.  
 
2.4.4 The Kachung Plantation 
In 2007, Green Resources bought the Norwegian Afforestation Group (NAG), and 
by this acquired the 660-hectare Kachung Forest (Green Resources 2011d). NAG 
got a planting permit from NFA in 1999, and the designated area of GR accounts 
for most of the plantation (Green Resources 2012).  
 
The forest is located in Dokolo District in Northern Uganda, about 30 kilometers 
south by car from the city of Lira. The plantation lies at an altitude averaging 
1000 meters above sea level, and the average temperature is 28 Celsius (Green 
Resources 2011d). Kachung is located in a district with rainy seasons similar to 
the Bukaleba plantation. The plantation area covers 2,670 hectares of land, in 
which approximately 2,100 are useful for planting trees, 530 hectares are set aside 
for conservation, and the remaining 73 hectares are to be used to build 
infrastructure (Green Resources 2011d). By 2012, the plantation size was 2,021 
hectares. The plantation is run by a subsidiary of Green Resources, Lango 
Forestry Company (LFC). LFC plant 90% pinus carribea hondurensis, and 9% 
various eucalyptus species on the plantation (Green Resources 2012). The overall 
purpose with this plantation is to grow trees for sawn timber, utility pole 
production and carbon sequestration under the A/R CDM afforestation 
methodology. Pine trees grown for sawlogs are cultivated with 20-year rotations, 
and 160 hectares of this wood have gained resources from SPGS grants. The 
eucalyptus trees are grown with 10-year rotations and are used for utility poles.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Encroachment level is a term used by NFA to define how much land that is 
inhabited within the central forest reserves. Hence, encroachment means illegal 
settlement/illegal occupation of land. The word does not say anything about the 
socio-economic situation of the people living off the land, nor does it say anything 
about how long the settlements have been in the CFR.  
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Figure 2: Map showing the location of Kachung Forest Reserve in Uganda
7
 
 
Source: Google.com 
 
2.4.5 Certifications 
Kachung got the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certificate and the Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity Alliance Standard validation (CCBA) in 2011. In 
2012 they got CDM certification. It was the first of GAS projects to get A/R CDM 
certification. The Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are sold to the Swedish 
Energy Agency (SEA), and is supposed to be the longest carbon transaction deal 
in the world lasting from 2012-2032; it is worth more than $4 million. The project 
is estimated to deliver 30,000 tCO2e carbon credits in 2012 and 240 000 in 2017 
(Green Resources 2012). The company has managed to attain two high standard 
certifications they did not obtain in Bukaleba. This stems, according to interview 
respondents, from the fact that more effort put into community relations. 
Furthermore, villages in the area where Kachung is located boarders the forests. In 
Bukaleba they are placed within the plantation. NFA defines the encroachment 
levels to be significantly lower (10,03%). Hence, conflict over land is lower in 
Kachung than in Bukaleba. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The red circle represents the approximate location of Kachung CFR.  
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Figure 3: Overview Bukaleba and Kachung Central Forest Reserves 
‘ Encroachment are all activities defined as illegal in Central Forest Reserves by NFA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Bukaleba Kachung 
Name of subsidiary 
Busoga Forestry 
Company Lango Forestry Company 
Carbon Standard VCS A/R CDM 
Carbon credits sold For sale 
Sold to the Swedish Energy 
Agency 
Other certifications FSC FCS+CCB 
Villages in-/outside the 
CFR Inside Outside 
Area in hectares 9165 2670 
Plantable area in ha Ca. 4500  Ca. 2100 
Location in Uganda East North 
Community land 500 ha No reliable information obtained 
Level of encroachment 
in the plantation' 49,67 % 10,03 % 
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3.0 The Carbon Economy and the Emergence of Carbon 
Markets 
This section is a literature review explaining the background for the development 
of carbon markets. It starts with a short analysis on the issue of global warming 
and its significance, before proceeding to explain the relationship between climate 
change and forestry. The next section focuses on the emergence of carbon markets 
with special attention on the voluntary carbon market and the Verified Carbon 
Standard, and the regulatory Clean Development Mechanism. The last section 
focus on how the market works in practice with focus on banking, price 
mechanisms, certifications and incentives of the relevant actors. Since the thesis 
focuses specifically on a carbon forestry project, examples from forestry are 
provided in the different sections.   
 
3.1 Global Warming 
Increasing CO2-levels may affect the biosphere directly, but the main cause for 
concern is the effect the CO2 has on greenhouse gases (GHG) contributing to 
warming our planet too quickly (Swingland 2003). Scientists and researchers 
across the globe acknowledge that the human made emission of climate gases, 
including the release of carbon, into the atmosphere is disrupting severely the 
natural state of our planet. Skeptics, on the other hand, argue that the global 
warming is a part of the natural variability in the planet’s temperature. Most 
scientists do not support the last view anymore (Bayon, Hawn and Hamilton 
2007).  
 
The greenhouse gases let the sunlight into the Earth’s atmosphere, but it hinders 
heat released from the sun’s warming of the planet to get back out. Six GHGs are 
commonly included in carbon credits: CO2, nitrus oxide, methane, sulfur 
hexafluoride, hydro fluorocarbons, and perfluorocarbons. GHG pollutions are 
traded in carbon credits equal to one metric ton of CO2 reduction (Bayon, Hawn 
and Hamilton 2007). The current GHG emissions are 20% higher than year 2000 
measures. Before the end of the 19
th
 century, our planet had been cooling down 
since about year 1000, and the temperatures have risen about 0,6 degrees Celsius 
the last 150 years (Alfsen 2001). Throughout the same period, carbon emissions 
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have also increased sharply. Since mid 18
th
 century, there has been an increase of 
31% CO2 in the atmosphere, believed to be accountable for 60% of the GHG-
induced global warming (Swingland 2003).  
 
The goal of not warming our planet more than 2 degrees Celsius by 2020 will not 
be met with today’s emission rates. The work on diminishing GHGs got 
negatively affected by the economic downturn in 2008 and 2009, but in spite of 
crisis in the Eurozone and difficulties in the United State’s economy, the focus of 
reducing pollution is now picked up again (Höhne et al. 2012). Technically, it is 
possible to meet the two-degree target by 2020; the challenge is the present pace 
of action. 
 
One understands why there is a tremendously large focus on minimizing the 
current and future carbon emissions viewing the numbers above. One of the 
urgent opportunities, which embrace the market and business Green Resources 
operate within, include biosphere management. Companies can engage in this by 
preventing deforestation, and committing in reforestation/afforestation of unused 
land, and land unsuitable for agricultural use.  
 
3.2 Climate Change and Forestry 
Forests are estimated to have covered about 57 million km
2
, or almost nine times 
the size of Russia, before humans engaged in agricultural activities (Goldewijk 
2001, referred to in Swingland 2003). Before the agricultural revolution 8000 
years ago, forests accounted for disclosure of more than twice the amount of 
carbon in the preindustrial atmosphere, and circulating 10% of all atmospheric 
CO2 every year through photosynthesis (Swingland 2003).  
 
The human impact on carbon emissions escalated during the industrial revolution, 
and by 1900 approximately 20-30% of the planet’s original forest area had been 
lost, accounting for an increase of about 45% more atmospheric CO2 since 1850 
(Swingland 2003). Since the major industrialization of the oil industry emerged, 
carbon emissions from fossil fuels surpassed the emissions from deforestation. 
After the energy industry (25,9%), the second largest emitting sector is the 
remaining industry (19,4%). Land-change and deforestation of tropical forests, 
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however, still contributes about 15-20% of today’s human induced carbon 
emissions and is the third largest emitting sector (Bellassen et al. 2008; Werf et al. 
2009)
8
. These numbers are disputed. In 2008 some researchers recalculated 
emissions from deforestation, and found that emission rates were around 12%, 
which is considerably lower (Werf et al. 2009). In 2010, there was a decrease of 
15% in GHGs from forestry (Höhne et al. 2012). Nevertheless, forestation 
programs and forestation management is acknowledged to play a significant role 
in combating climate change and the increasing emissions of CO2 (Swingland 
2003).  
 
The different literature reviewed show that land-use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) activities are seen as important for global climate change mitigation. 
These activities include forest activities. The forest carbon market was worth 237 
million USD at its peak in 2011. Values increased by 33%, while transaction 
volumes declined with 22% from 2010 (Peters-Stanley, Hamilton and Yin 2012).   
 
3.3 The Emergence of Carbon Markets 
Carbon markets were created as a response to the recognition that global warming 
is a fact. In 1997, 37 industrialized countries and the European Community 
organized a summit in Kyoto to reduce emissions from climate gasses. The public 
debate in the Kyoto negotiations focused on how to make a global market for 
trading carbon credits in order to reduce human activity induced climate change. 
With the objective that one ton of a greenhouse gas emitted anywhere in the world 
affect every single country; a global market would be a desirable outcome giving 
everyone an incentive to reduce their emissions.  
 
By end 2012 five major carbon markets existed  
1. The European Union’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS)  
2. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)  
3. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) northeastern United 
States 
                                                 
8
 The numbers do not take into account the carbon emissions caused by 
degradation of forests. Werf et.al (2009) state that deforestation is the second 
largest anthropogenic source of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.  
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4. New Zealand’s Emission Trading Scheme 
5.  Voluntary markets  
(Newell, Pizer and Raimi 2013) 
 
Carbon prices in all markets have declined since 2008 due to global recession. 
Despite financial turbulence, carbon markets are by far the largest environmental 
market in the world, both in terms of volume and market value (Newell, Pizer and 
Raimi 2013).  
 
Carbon dioxide is an intangible product. The nature of the commodity demand 
integrity and value stated by how they are defined, represented and guaranteed 
(Merger and Pistorius 2011). WWF (2008) states that the quality of forestry 
carbon projects depends on whether they are: 
- Real 
- Supplementary 
- Quantifiable 
- Independently verifiable 
- Perpetual 
- Unique 
- If they have sustainable development benefits 
 
Information asymmetry between the seller and buyer are especially a problem in 
carbon markets. In general, low quality carbon credits are cheaper to develop than 
those of higher quality. If there is too little focus on quality in the market there are 
considerable risk for opportunistic behavior of the project developers (Merger and 
Pistorius 2011). A consequence may be that high-quality projects lose their 
competitiveness to the lower quality projects, as buyers will purchase the low-cost 
carbon credits. This assumption is in accordance with rational choice theory
9
, and 
leads to a “race-to-the-bottom” because the purchaser is not aware of the 
differences in quality on the products. The global financial instruments enhanced 
under Kyoto include CDM and the parallel voluntary carbon markets. 
 
                                                 
9
 The rational choice perspective is presented in the theory chapter.   
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3.4 Voluntary Carbon Markets 
Voluntary carbon markets (VCMs) existed prior to the 1997 Kyoto negotiations, 
but grew alongside the regulatory market after it was created. VCMs are 
noticeably smaller than the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) with 0.1% of 
the value and 0.02% of the volume in the global carbon market (Peters-Stanley et 
al. 2011). While there has been a decline in the regulatory framework market, 
voluntary markets have faced growth: from 2009 to 2010 the market grew by 
34%. Forty-five percent of these credits were land based, and 29% were related to 
the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)
10
 
carbon market showing that forest-based projects are an important part of the 
VMCs (Peters-Stanley et al. 2011). In terms of financial value, VCMs have grown 
rapidly with an increase from $43 million revenues in 2002 to a peak of $705 
million in 2008. Similar to other carbon markets and for the same reasons, the 
voluntary market has decreased in market value and issued credits equivalent to 
95 million metric tons worth $572 million in 2011 (Newell, Pizer and Raimi 2013, 
131).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 REDD is an effort initiated by the United Nations to create a financial value for 
the carbon stored in forests. The idea is to offer incentives for developing 
countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low carbon 
projects. REDD+, the extension of REDD includes preservation and sustainable 
management of forests.  
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Figure 4: Historical offset demand by transacted volume, all voluntary carbon 
markets 
Note: Based on 763MtCO2e of offsets transacted and reported to Ecosystem Marketplace over 
seven survey years.  
Source: Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013) 
 
Historically, many voluntary organizations occupied with environment were 
engaged in developing VCM-projects. The share of non-profit initiatives, 
however, has decreased compared to for-profit; especially after 2005. Today, 85% 
of the VCM are occupied by corporate initiatives, compared to 30% before 2002 
(Peters-Stanley et al. 2011). Many organizations offer these credits and there are 
no overall institutionalized standard in the market for certification and monitoring. 
A consequence is that standards for evaluation and monitoring of the greenhouse 
gases are less rigid than for example CDM. Benefits and disadvantages come with 
such a system: on one side it reduces bureaucracy, but on the other side it could 
lead to certification of credits that do not deliver the listed benefits (Benessaiah 
2012).  
 
A result of the lacking regulation of the VCMs is that prices have tended to stay at 
a lower level than CDM credits. Another consequence is a lack of legitimacy of 
the standards. However, pressure from institutional environment on standards 
safeguards a minimum quality on the carbon credits and serve as an insurance 
mechanism for the reliability of standards (Merger and Pistorius 2011). Efforts to 
improve increased carbon quality have therefore been taken. Standards and 
registers have been developed to ensure that double counting does not occur and 
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to establish methodologies and rules (Benessaiah 2012). Third-party certification 
is seen as a fundamental factor for market functionality as it offers quality 
assurance mechanisms to hamper moral hazard and information asymmetry 
(Merger and Pistorius 2011). Transaction costs are also decreased as less self-
monitoring of the product bought is necessary. Project creators demand standards 
that are well defined and easily applicable to the lowest cost possible. The aim is 
to get a high potential to attain good prices on the carbon. Buyers want that 
standards are legitimate, credible and that no public criticism occurs after they 
have purchased certified carbon credits (Merger and Pistorius 2011).  
 
3.4.1 Carbon Forestry in the Voluntary Markets 
The over-the-counter (OTC) voluntary market comprises the largest amount of 
forestry-based carbon credit transactions. The background is mainly that the 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) of the European Union has chosen not to include 
forestry in its framework (Merger and Pistorius 2011). EU’s choice is based on 
the complexity of forestry credits with regards to uncertainties related to land 
tenure systems and because such activities target a variety of stakeholders 
(European Union 2008). Furthermore, many developing countries lack sufficient 
monitoring systems. Hence, methodological issues such as liability and 
permanence are insufficiently addressed. The last issue EU address is the problem 
of permanent credits. This means that Afforestation/Reforestation (A/R) CDM 
credits have to be replaced after a certain period of time, and that a provider of 
credits can go out of the market. If that happens, another body needs to take on the 
responsibility to guarantee environmental integrity (European Union 2008).   
 
Another common trade option in this market is direct purchase from one provider. 
The OTC voluntary market is characterized by a variety of different actors 
originating from different contexts. The Voluntary Emission Reduction Credits 
(VERs) are generated on a project basis and trade of the credits happen on a 
voluntary and individual basis. There are no international body controlling the 
trade, nor does it exist any universally accepted rules and regulations controlling 
the quality of the carbon credits (Merger and Pistorius 2011).  
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Figure 5: Transacted volume and average price by buyer and seller types in the 
OTC market in 2012 
 
Notes: Based on 324 organizations reporting 66 MtCO2e associated with business roles and buyer 
types.  
Source: Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013) 
 
As mentioned above, criticism of the market finds its arguments within this 
context. Much attention has been given to the legitimacy of forest carbon credits 
in the media and other public arenas. The discussion often focuses on whether the 
forest carbon credits harm peasant people and environment. Measurement, 
monitoring and verification of forest carbon stocks in addition to satisfactorily 
handling of forestry-specific uncertainties such as lastingness and leakage in 
forest carbon projects are often subject to discussion (Merger and Pistorius 2011). 
Carbon credits from forestry are complex products, and it can be hard for the 
customer to understand what they are actually purchasing.  
 
NGOs have developed certification schemes the last years, but none have 
succeeded in gathering all aspects a standard should include, such as social and 
environmental aspects, monitoring, validation and verification standards, in 
addition to registration of VERs. The Gold Standard is the one closest to fulfilling 
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all the criteria. These standards are increasingly important, but most forestry 
carbon companies need certification from different organizations in order to cover 
all aspects needed to gain trustworthiness and transparency in the market.  
 
3.4.2 The Verified Carbon Standard 
The Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) was an initiative taken by a collection of 
business and environmental leaders with the aim of improving quality assurance 
in voluntary carbon markets. The first VCS requirements were defined in 2005 by 
a team of global carbon market experts from the International Emission Trading 
Association (IETA) and the World Economic Forum. It is a NGO located in 
Washington, and Det Norske Veritas (DNV) verifies many of the projects under 
this certification.  
 
A variety of documents and verifications take place to gain VCS certification. 
This includes several registration documents; project description, validation report 
registration representation, and validation representation. The project description 
includes project starting date, scale, crediting period, baseline scenario, 
additionality and methodology deviations, in addition to promises of socio-
economic development for local communities (Busoga Forestry Company Co. Ltd 
and Green Resources 2012). An external validator, in Green Resources’ case, Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV), carries out the validation report. The purpose of this 
validation is to have a third party securing proper project design and compliance 
with relevant VCS criteria (Decq and Espejo 2012). The two last documents are 
defining concepts and stating who the involved actors in the process are. In 
addition to registration documents, issuance documents including a monitoring 
report, issuance representation, verification report and verification representation 
are needed. The last set of reports is made to verify that project operates in line 
with the descriptions and criteria in the first set of documents.  
 
To gain VCS certification, any methodology developed under the UN CDM can 
be used (Verified Carbon Standard 2013). In addition, VCS list fourteen different 
methodologies for forestry on their home page. The documents needed in the 
process include information about the projects methodology, criteria, process, 
findings and so on. To gain VCS is a detailed process, and involved stakeholders 
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are interviewed. Reviewing the verification report of Green Resources, it becomes 
clear that the company’s management and the NFA are interviewed (Decq and 
Espejo 2012). Other stakeholders, including local NGOs, local environmental 
offices and the rural population settled in and alongside the plantation, do not 
seem to be consulted in the process. This is different from the CDM certification 
process.  
 
The quality of the research conducted in relation to VCS verification may be the 
reason why the standard is so successful in the voluntary carbon market. VCS 
kept its place as number one among independent standards in 2011 with 28% 
market share. In 2010 most of the VCS credits traded stemmed from REDD 
projects, but in 2011 also VCS Afforestation/Reforestation and Improved Forest 
Management (IFM) projects proved important. Both A/R CDM credits and 
American Carbon Registry (ACR) forest carbon projects sold at record volumes 
(Peters-Stanley, Hamilton and Yin 2012). This may show that demand for 
certified forestry credits are present in the market. The average price for VCS 
projects was 5.2 USD in 2012 (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013). OTC credits from 
forestry in general increased from $4.2/tCO2e in 2009 to $5.6/tCO2e in 2010 
(Diaz, Hamilton and Peters-Stanley 2011).  
 
3.5 The Regulatory Market: the Clean Development Mechanism 
The Clean Development Mechanism was set up as part of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
background for this initiative was dissatisfaction with the Joint Implementation 
(JI) concept. The JI projects allow industrialized countries to set up carbon 
reducing projects in other industrialized countries
11
. JI excluded the developing 
countries from the first commitment period, making it challenging for them when 
they also had to commit to emission reductions. CDM has its own market for 
certified emission reductions (CER) undertaken by developing countries that can 
be used for compliance in other programs (Newell, Pizer and Raimi 2013).  
 
The CDM is not a cap-and-trade system, but an instrument to convert emission 
reduction efforts in emerging economies into credits that can be used to balance 
capped emissions somewhere else. It was created to offer additional flexibility for 
                                                 
11
 Referred to as Annex 1-countries in the Kyoto Protocol.  
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industrialized countries that wanted to meet their specified obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol. In 2011, about 300 tons of offsets were issued under the CDM 
making it the second largest market for carbon credits after the EU ETS (Newell, 
Pizer and Raimi 2013). Credits generated through the CDM is called Certified 
Emission Reductions (CER) and more than 6200 projects had been approved and 
more than one billion offset credits had been issued in the whole market by 2011 
(Newell, Pizer and Raimi 2013).  
 
The EU ETS has been a major purchaser of CERs, but they exclude certain types 
of credits as for example A/R CDM credits (Newell, Pizer and Raimi 2013). The 
main reasons is the problem of non-permanence and other risks related to forestry 
activities. This is also the reason why carbon credits generated from A/R CDM 
activities are not regular CERs. Credits obtained through forestry are defined as 
short-term credits (tCERs) and long-term credits (lCERs), and these have different 
durations of validity. Generally, few afforestation/reforestation CDM projects 
have been implemented to forestry projects in developing countries during the 
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. By May 2011 22 A/R CDM 
projects were registered compared with over 3000 CDM registered energy 
projects (UNFCCC 2011b in Yamanoshita and Amano (2012)).  
 
By February 2013, eight such projects were registered in Uganda. Lack of 
finances, competing existing commitments of public staff and insufficient 
employment within the Designated National Authority (DNA) have made the 
approval process for CDM in Uganda slow (Peskett, Schreckenberg and Brown 
2011). The National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) is involved 
in the authorization process for CDM projects. They make the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) guidelines the District Environment Officers (DEOs) 
use in the approval process of CDM. The offices working on these issues 
generally have low capacity to assess the projects making the process slow and 
less meaningful in practice. Given the long-term perspective on tree plantations 
and the complicated conditions in many rural areas with poor communities, 
projects that do not include local stakeholders have a strong possibility of failing 
(Boyd, Gutierrez and Chang 2007). The CDM was developed with the dual goal 
of sustainable development for developing countries and reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions in the most cost effective way possible (Benessaiah 2012). These 
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synergies exist in theory, but they are limited, and by some even presented as 
contradictory, in practice.  
 
Financial, institutional and administrative problems were found in many A/R 
CDM project developments. Two sources of problems were  
1. Complex rules  
2. Prices on expiring temporary credits 
(Dargusch, Harrison and S.Thomas 2010).  
 
Before credits can be generated and sold, it is a lengthy process to register such 
projects. The administration costs are quite high and this hinders many actors 
from engaging in the market. Strict rules and regulations have to be met and all 
A/R CDM projects have to be approved by the CDM Executive Board in Bonn, 
Germany. A Product Design Document (PDD) has to be developed by the project 
developers themselves. The document must consist of estimates of GHG 
mitigation potential, an additionality test, description of the baseline, and the 
presentation of the public stakeholder consultation. To gain CDM approval, the 
local public has to be properly consulted (through local governments, NGOs, 
households and so on) in order to give them a chance to express possible concerns 
about the project (Point Carbon and Perspectives 2008). Additionality is another 
central concern to get approval. The project document must prove that the project 
would not have been realized to sequester the same amount without the ability to 
sell climate quotas through CDM. It is worth mentioning that the two criteria 
mentioned here are subject to criticism as it is e.g. easy to fix numbers.  
 
Despite the bureaucracy linked to the CDM certification process, the international 
market for temporary credits from A/R CDM projects created exceptional market 
value in 2011. The reason is the high volume of credits contracted before the end 
of the Kyoto Protocol’s first period (Peters-Stanley, Hamilton and Yin 2012). 
Generally, CDM projects cannot have started before December 31
st
 1999. The 
result is lack of approval of many projects because they started at an earlier phase. 
They therefore have to sell their credits in the voluntary markets.  
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3.6 How does Carbon Markets Work in Practice? 
When a buyer purchases carbon it takes place in a single transaction where the 
customer gets permanent ownership to the carbon. This structure poses a risk for 
sellers and buyers, as forests are biological assets (Bigsby 2009). The most 
common risks linked to forestry are fires, winds and pests. All these occurrences 
may reduce the amount of stored carbon, and can expose the forest owner of 
reduced accountability for the carbon they have sold, but no longer have. Risk is 
also linked to the nature of emerging markets. Carbon finance is a new creation 
that is subject to changing legislation, technology innovations and climate change 
science (Bigsby 2009). Risk and uncertainty affect prices negatively. Future price 
changes are negative for forest owners that may jeopardize their future liability, as 
forest loss may be more costly than the carbon money can cover. The risk posed 
to buyers is that they may not pay the correct price for the product they are 
purchasing.  
 
Dealing with intangible products, carbon trade entails a defined carbon asset. 
Chicago Climate Exchange created a financial instrument defined as 1 metric tons 
of CO2. When carbon is traded agreements are built around increases of 100 
metric tons of CO2 (Bigsby 2009). A mechanism for converting carbon 
sequestration from forests into a measure of carbon that meets the specific 
definition of a carbon asset is necessary to realize a financial asset that can be sold 
in the market. The complexity of the construction of these products is very high, 
and various measurement methods and regulations exist, and comparison to 
advanced financial instruments and institutions can be drawn.  
 
The process include calculations of CO2 equivalents, a set time frame stating how 
long the asset is under contract, and a plan over the forest management that results 
in the CO2 equivalence (Bigsby 2009). The project developer is obliged to 
undertake a long-standing commitment to maintain a forest. Common 
requirements are commitment to a long-term forest estate plan to monitor harvest 
and reforestation activities. Restrictions on species chosen are also common. 
Together, this limits the wanted forester to be one with a normally structured 
forest with regular harvest, or one that never cuts down the trees (Bigsby 2009).  
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3.6.1 The Role of Banking and Brokers 
The length of the commitment periods is root to some of the constraints of the 
carbon markets. Infinite banking and to a lesser extent, borrowing, are permitted 
within the commitment periods. The emission cap for a given period is fixed, but 
there is insecurity about emission caps for future commitment periods 
(Fankhauser and Hepburn 2010). Permitting banking and borrowing leads to 
flexibility and may even out prices and costs with increasing cost effectiveness 
and without negatively affecting the climate (Fell, MacKenzie and Pizer 2012). 
Banking carbon allowances address the problem of uncertain costs because no 
trading between periods forces actors to handle shocks straight away. Despite 
clear benefits of allowing banking, there are also some disadvantages. Banking 
connects expectations over time so that present prices are affected by expected 
future prices. The government’s commitment to their carbon policy and the 
public’s perception of their commitment also influence prices (Newell, Pizer and 
Raimi 2013).  
 
Another important role include the role of a broker. The broker matches specific 
sequestration requirements the buyer has to the owner fitting his needs. He/she is 
paid for being the intermediary but does not own carbon credits in any sense 
(Bigsby 2009). Brokers are not required and some buyers purchase credits directly 
from the provider. However, brokers may limit transaction costs for customers 
and serve as a reliable option in securing good carbon credits. Examples of 
brokers in the market involve: 
1. Trexler Climate and Energy Services 
2. Natsource 
3. Ecosecurities 
4. CO2e 
5. Carbon TradeXchange 
(Taiyab 2006, 15) 
 
3.6.2 Price Mechanisms 
Two basic mechanisms of all goods apply to the carbon market; first of all, 
willingness to pay for a good is limited. Second, the costs of mitigation are 
considerable. Cost-effectiveness in carbon markets is therefore essential for it to 
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work properly. One alternative that helps reduce costs is to allow for flexibility 
between different policy instruments (Fankhauser and Hepburn 2010). The price 
on carbon is a function of supply and demand. Price volatility is argued to be a 
natural part of the changing fundamentals in the market.  
 
Following market transactions Peters-Stanley, Hamilton and Yin (2012) found 
that prices followed general market principles. The prices increased as credits 
moved up the value chain from project developers all the way to the end users. 
There was a distinction between the regulated and the voluntary markets; in 
voluntary markets, developers traded the largest volumes directly with end-users 
to prices below average, and smaller volumes to secondary markets for a 
somewhat higher price than average.  
 
Prices are also a function of policies set by governments and supranational 
institutions. There are a few options when it comes to market-based mechanisms 
to carbon mitigation. One option is carbon pricing through taxes; another is 
quantity-based mechanism as the trade- and cap-scheme we have today. Some 
suggest that combinations of these two mechanisms would be a viable option to 
make the market more effective than it is today (Fankhauser and Hepburn 2010). 
A tax system is interminably elastic, while an allowance system is inelastic as the 
amount of allowances are inelastic. By using a hybrid of the two systems, policy 
makers could create a desired supply curve fitting the international market for 
climate quotas.  
 
The fact that emission caps for a given period is fixed, in addition to insecurity 
about emission caps for future commitment periods, influence prices significantly. 
This makes the prices less stabile than they would normally be if investors could 
foresee endurance in the market despite sequentially divided periods negotiated 
through climate negotiations. Short periods allow governments the flexibility to 
form their policies after changes in research on climate change and technology 
developments. They also allow periods to coincide with electoral cycles 
(Fankhauser and Hepburn 2010). Both too low and too high prices may suggest 
that the market design is not sufficiently efficient (Fankhauser and Hepburn 
2010). 
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Prices in forest carbon projects in 2011 exceeded prices twice as high as the year 
before. Domestic-only markets drove the prices, and may not reflect the price and 
value achieved in the international market. In general, the average price in this 
market is a reflection of diverse prices varying greatly from less than $1/tCO2e to 
more than $100/tCO2e (Peters-Stanley, Hamilton and Yin 2012).  
 
Figure 6: EUA and CER prices 2008-2013 
Source: Redd-monitor.org (Lang 2013) 
 
3.6.3 The Importance of Certifications 
The risks of non-permanence and leakage associated with carbon forestry projects 
make sound certification of projects important. Other significant factors are 
consideration of biodiversity and local population, as forestry carbon projects 
demand large areas of land. A selection of different standards, protocols and 
verification methods exist to regulate carbon offsets. Some of these are:  
 
1. CDM/JI Standard – set up under the Kyoto Protocol by international 
regulatory authorities.  
2. The Gold Standard – created by several NGOs for energy projects. 
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3. The Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standards – created by 
many NGOs and private sector for land-based carbon projects. 
4. Self-developed standards – formed by individual providers of VERs.  
5. Labeling Schemes – developed by some providers in the market.  
(Taiyab 2006, 9) 
 
Since the different certifications cover different aspects, there is often useful to 
have more than one certification in a project.  Twenty-nine percent of the credits 
sold in 2011 had standards such as the Climate, Community and Biodiversity 
Alliance Standards (CCB), and projects in this classification got higher prices in 
the market (Peters-Stanley, Hamilton and Yin 2012). Independent standards 
presented different prices, and prices were in general determined by project 
attributes: the type, the project and the stage the project had reached at time of 
transaction. Generally, highly recognized certifications are the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC), CDM, CCBA and the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS). Higher 
prices indicate that the willingness to pay increase as companies and private 
persons perceive certifications as insurance that they are buying a high-quality 
product.  
 
Despite the quality reassurance certifications are seen to give, some remain 
skeptical towards the use of these. There is an ongoing discussion about the 
legitimacy of the certification arrangement, and many are skeptical that 
certifications deliver all listed co-benefits and environmental effects. A common 
argument related to this issue is that companies pay verifiers to obtain standards 
and certifications. This again means that the providers of verifications rely on 
companies’ business models to sell their products. A report made by the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) found that one fifth of the Certified Emission Reduction 
(CER) in the primary CDM market came from “non-additional” projects that 
never should have been approved. The reason is that the projects would have been 
realized without the extra income that is generated from sales of carbon credits. 
One of the main verifiers in the CDM market, SGS, got suspended temporarily in 
2009 by the CDM Executive Board because they were unable to prove that several 
projects were properly audited (Murray 2009). In other words, they could not 
prove that all projects fulfilled the additionality requirement that is an important 
precondition for obtaining CDM certification.  
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3.6.4 Incentives and Motives Driving the Carbon Markets 
The idea of creating a carbon market in the first place came both from corporate 
and political initiators. Incentives to purchase carbon credits range from the search 
for profit maximization to more altruistic motivations. Speculation in order to gain 
profits exists in all markets, and financial instruments are constructed in a way 
that makes sale and resale possible.  
 
The carbon retail market is small and disintegrated. Retailers are predominantly 
based in Australia, Europe and the U.S., and are estimated to be around 30-40 
globally (Taiyab 2006). Research shows that providers of carbon credits in the 
Voluntary Carbon Markets consist of a diverse collection of institutions ranging 
from non profit-initiatives to for-profit companies interested in promoting 
environmental and social concerns (Bayon, Hawn and Hamilton 2007; Taiyab 
2006). It is clear that most private companies engage in carbon projects in order to 
earn profits. Even though they want financial returns on their investments, they 
can also have altruistic motives. 
 
The markets’ customers can be divided into five categories:  
1. Businesses 
2. Individuals and celebrities 
3. Governments 
4. Non-profit organizations 
5. International conferences and events 
(Taiyab 2006) 
 
They all engage in carbon offsetting with different aims. On the purchaser side, a 
variety of actors choose to engage in VCMs for different reasons such as 
marketing, a response to an increased focus on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and green technology, increased environmental reporting, and eventual 
changes in policies imposed by governments (Hamilton et al. 2010; Taiyab 2006) 
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Related to the regulatory market you find the motivation of compliance 
obligation. Many countries committed themselves to reduce their climate gas 
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol I and II. Hence, they have two options:  
1. Cut pollution domestically. 
2. Buy climate quotas to make up for the domestic pollution surpassing their 
obligation goals.  
In addition, you also find the same incentives as in voluntary markets.  
 
Most forest carbon transactions happen in voluntary markets and show that the 
main motivation for buying offsets are CSR goals. Buyers motivated by resale and 
investment bought one forth of the credits. Compliance market’s customers have 
the same incentives. In addition, many bought credits with expectation of future 
regulation after the first Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period (Peters-Stanley, 
Hamilton and Yin 2012).  
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4.0 Neoliberalism and Institutionalism 
The first subsection in this chapter briefly explains the main neoliberal arguments 
for a market solution to the climate change problem. Next, some of the 
controversies using such a theory to combat the problem are discussed. The 
second subsection focus on institutionalism. Property rights are given attention 
because it is an important part of institutionalizing a market. Rational choice and 
historical institutionalism are used to explain the creation of carbon markets. To 
get a critical view on new institutionalism, critical institutionalism is presented 
briefly. Lastly, commercialization of the market in the view of Karl Polanyi is 
explained.  
 
4.1 Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism represents a reassertion of Adam Smith’s liberal political economy. 
It has been the dominant political economy ideology in the second half of the 
twentieth century, especially in the U.S. and Britain, and many think of the 
policies Regan and Thatcher advocated for and implemented in the 1980s. Their 
economic agenda was dominated by deregulation of financial markets, 
privatization, weakening of institutions for social protection, weakening of labor 
unions, opening up of international markets and so on. 
 
Milton Friedman, one of the most prominent scholars within neoliberal thinking, 
built on Smith’s arguments in his economic theory. Although the liberal ideal of a 
society remained in focus, the acknowledgement that this ideal could not be 
reached by market forces alone, and was therefore supplemented by some 
government regulation. One of Friedman’s main arguments is that any constraints 
on freedom of trade reduce the well being for some individuals by denying them 
the opportunity to improve their situation (Clarke 2005). Hence, neoliberalism can 
be described as “restructuring of the world to facilitate the spread of free markets” 
(Igoe and Brockington 2007, 433). According to this definition, neoliberalism is 
about privatization and commodification of markets and their products. The 
tradition is associated with deregulation, and diminished influence by the state and 
its capacity to regulate. Neoliberals tend to view the economy as forever 
expanding and is in line with the globalization we see today, with increased free 
trade, removal of customs barriers, trade unions etc. However, if a market does 
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not exist, states or international institutions must create it. In this perspective, 
neoliberal policies are revising preceding relationships between markets, states 
and civil societies (Heynen et al. 2007).    
 
Neoliberals emphasize that living standards of the employed population have 
increased as a result of capitalist accumulation (Clarke 2005). Proponents of 
neoliberalism emphasize that creation of new and free markets, which focus on 
environmental issues, can provide new types of resources into projects 
diminishing global warming. The A/R CDM is an example of a policy that 
focuses on the poorer parts of the world. Here, governments lack resources to deal 
with problems of climate change. Moreover, the neoliberal notion promise 
increased democracy, and to protect rural population and their property rights. 
One last relevant aspect is promises to promote sustainable and environmentally 
friendly practices as profitable (Igoe and Brockington 2007). Green Resources is 
an example of a company that operates within this win-win narrative.  
 
Despite his critical view on neoliberalism, Harvey (2005, 2) describe the theory in 
general terms 
 
“A theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade”. 
 
This view on neoliberalism is in line with the political arguments for creating a 
carbon market. International trade and global climate change are linked closely 
together in the world’s carbon markets. Hence, carbon markets are seen as one of 
the last and most ambitious expressions of neoliberalism. The main argument for 
a market-based solution to climate change relies on the idea that it is the most 
economically efficient solution to achieve lower GHG emissions. A related idea is 
that when costs for polluting are paid, informed entrepreneurs will adapt to 
accurate price signals by changing investment away from environmentally 
damaging technologies towards environmentally friendly solutions (Lohmann 
2009). Not all paint the same rosy picture of this economic theory. Some case 
studies investigating commercial carbon forestry projects have found that rural 
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people have been displaced due to this activity (Prudham 2009).  
 
Another critic of neoliberalism is Noam Chomsky (1999). He writes that 
neoliberalism defines the political economic paradigm of our time. He states that 
policies and processes are organized in a way that allows a handful of very rich 
people to control as much as possible of the social life to augment individual 
profits. With concern to carbon markets, one interpretation is that neoliberalism 
promotes the market of green services through structures that are abstract in 
nature for local contexts, and turns it into a product that can be sold somewhere 
else. With regard to carbon credits, the market is often built on an uneven 
relationship between the North and South, where private companies buy what 
previously belonged to the community, and promote their activities through 
sustainable development, productivity, and preservation values (Lovell, Bulkeley 
and Liverman 2009). 
 
Whether or not one agrees with the neoliberal idea of creating a market solution to 
reduce GHGs, it certainly reflects transformation of governance. Markets, 
privatization, commercialization and commodification have become central 
elements of environmental regulation (Prudham 2009). The neoliberalization of 
international climate policy through policies such as emissions trading has led to a 
substantial reformation of governance competencies between supranational, 
national and non-state participants (Bailey 2007). This will be discussed more in 
the next section about institutionalism.  
 
4.2 Institutionalism 
Common questions are asked across the fields of international relations, 
economics and political science. These include: 
 
1. Why do rational states engage in the formation of international institutions 
that would represent restrictions on national freedom of action? 
2. How do institutions influence individual behavior, and how does 
individual behavior affect institutions? 
(Hall and Taylor 1996; Grieco 1988) 
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The answer to these questions is central in order to understand how and why 
carbon markets as an institution were created. Further, it is reasonable to assume 
that Green Resources and other actors’ behavior in the market is influenced by the 
legal framework set by the international community, national governments, civil 
society and so forth. The section below aims to provide a brief introduction to 
institutional theory together with an analysis on the creation of carbon markets. 
Elements from North’s (1984) New Institutionalism, including both historical and 
rational choice institutionalism, are presented in order to get a broader picture of 
the topic. After this, a view on institutionalism that is different or critical to 
North’s institutions will be presented. This school of thought is called “Critical 
Institutionalism” (Hall et al. 2013).  
 
Property rights are important in all institutional theories because rules lay the 
foundation for institutional behavior. Environmental problems are related to 
overexploitation of public goods and stem from incompletely defined property 
rights (Libecap 2008). In order for a market to function a foundation of rules and 
monitoring within the institutionalized market must occur. This is related to 
transferability, ownership and use of products (Rose-Ackerman 1985). The 
precondition for a market transaction to occur is that the seller is willing to give 
up the entitlement and a purchaser is willing to buy the product. Carbon markets 
are special because the products sold are intangible. There exist many intangible 
products, commonly referred to as services in the market place. What differs in 
carbon markets is that the buyer does not get any direct benefit from the 
acquisition. A government meets the goals in the Kyoto Protocol, and a business 
achieves goodwill in the market presenting themselves as a “green or socially 
responsible company”.  
 
The aspect of ownership within the property rights framework, and a basic 
precondition directly linked to carbon forestry projects, is access to land areas. A 
titleholder of property rights has the right to act in particular ways. In relation to 
forestry, an owner of land has the right to manage the area according to his wishes 
within the existing legal framework. This implies that the activity of a landholder 
may not be for the direct benefit of others not holding the entitlement. “Property 
rights convey the right to benefit and harm oneself or others” (Demsetz 1967, 
347). Consequently, property rights define how persons may be benefited or 
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harmed by certain actions. This acknowledgement leads to the close link between 
property rights and externalities discussed a bit further down.  
 
North (1984) define institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or more 
formally…a series of constrains on behavior taking form of principles and 
regulations”. Steinmo (2008) writes that institutionalism emphasize the role 
institutions play in shaping behavior. Institutionalism offers a good framework for 
studying the political creation of carbon markets and how it manifests itself in a 
specific forestry project. Institutional theory gives attention to real world 
questions, and focus on the way in which institutions structure and form behavior 
and outcomes (Steinmo 2008). More specifically, they focus on links between 
political authority and markets (Fligstein and Sweet 2002). A fundamental subject 
in all institutional analysis is how institutions affect the behavior of individuals 
(Hall and Taylor 1996). When institutions and government structures develop in 
markets, they influence the economic activity. The development of new markets is 
not a new phenomenon. The importance of market-based solutions, however, is 
argued to have grown: creating markets of rights to be exchanged with greater 
efficiency now solves problems that were before believed to belong to the polity 
(Tordjman 2004). Market and political arenas can develop alongside each other, 
and this is seen to be the case in the carbon markets.  Fligstein and Sweet (2002, 
1207) emphasize that “a central insight in institution theory is that markets cannot 
exist without authoritative rules to guide the interactions between economic 
actors”. In order for a market to work provision of property rights, governance 
structures and rules of exchange must be set by the state or other public 
authorities. Supranational institutions like the UN, and national governments play 
a central role in facilitating economic growth by providing a legal framework, 
social stability and regulation of class struggles.  
 
The process of economic development is related to the “emergence and 
consolidation of particular symbiotic relationships that form between rule 
structures, governmental organizations, and economic actors” (Fligstein and 
Sweet 2002, 1207). In theory, companies are able to operate in markets without 
any judicial system. In practice, states get involved as they set and enforce legal 
framework economic actors must follow. The academic literature typically 
discusses that institutional arrangements that promote economic growth are 
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preferred, while unwanted institutional arrangements produce rent seeking and 
lack of economic development (Fligstein and Sweet 2002). The idea behind CDM 
was to enhance economic growth in the countries that needed it most, and at the 
same time diminish emission of climate gases.  The additional verification 
standards in the voluntary markets aim to do the same, but are considered based 
on a less rigid system, as they are somewhat easier to obtain
12
. Carbon markets 
and their institutional structures, however, are discussed intensively in some 
milieus, as some think they are producing unwanted side effects. These can be 
seen as externalities.  
 
Externalities can be defined as side effects of an industrial or commercial activity 
that affect other actors without being reflected in the cost of the project. Hence, it 
represents non-priced social and economical benefits and disadvantages related to 
an activity. A central point is that externalities do not directly affect the decision 
maker. Externalities may effect people outside the market, and are central to the 
neo-classical criticism of market organization
13
 (Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962). 
In relation to carbon forests externalities designate all non-carbon impacts. 
Negative externalities can be decreased access to natural resources for the local 
population, monoculture plantations and fires. Positive externalities may include 
increased biodiversity, erosion protection and recreation. Generally, the value of 
externalities is difficult to assess (Simonet, Bouculat and Olivera 2012).   
 
4.2.1 Historical Institutionalism  
 Historical institutionalism embraces the view that political outcomes are both a 
product of rule following and interest maximizing among nation states and other 
interest groups (Steinmo 2008). Historical institutionalists define institutions as 
“the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded 
in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 
1996, 938).  
 
                                                 
12
 The differences between the standards will be discussed in light of the two 
forestry plantations visited in Uganda.  
13
 In economic theory external effects exist in consumption whenever 
consumption of one actor influences consumption of another actor. This means 
that no business operate without influencing other actors or stakeholders affected 
by the market.  
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Some features separate theorists within historical institutionalism from other 
forms of institutionalism. The first is the broad view they have of the relationship 
between institutions and individual behavior. There exist two social ontologies 
describing individuals and institutions in relation to each other. The first is the 
calculus approach. The calculus approach is quite similar to the rational choice 
institutional tradition described under, and those who adopt this view look at 
individual behavior as instrumental and based on strategic calculation. Individuals 
seek to maximize their goals to obtain maximum benefit, and their preferences are 
exogenously given. Institutions provide certainty about other actor’s behavior by 
provision of information, enforcement mechanisms for agreements etc. The main 
point is that actors behavior are influenced by their expectations of other actors’ 
behavior (Hall and Taylor 1996). In this view, no actor would sacrifice more 
economically and politically than others in order to achieve the goals of reduced 
emissions in climate change negotiations.  
 
The contrasting approach is termed the cultural approach, and emphasize that 
individual behavior is bounded by an individual’s worldview. Actors are not seen 
as utility maximizers, but rather utility satisfiers. Individuals are not entirely 
irrational or non-purposive, but tend to turn to established routines and familiar 
patterns of behavior to achieve their goals. The individuals’ actions depend on the 
analysis of a situation, and not on instrumental calculations alone. According to 
this approach, institutions highly influence actors’ identities, self-image and 
preferences. They also provide individuals with some strategic information  (ibid). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 
Kyoto Protocol and other institutional arrangements have most likely influenced 
some of the participants’ attitudes towards climate change and their efforts to deal 
with the situation. On the other hand, national and subnational institutions have 
done the same.   
 
Historical institutionalism also emphasizes power asymmetries associated with the 
formation and development in institutions. Theoreticians within this tradition have 
concentrated much on the way institutions allocate power disproportionately 
across social groups (Hall and Taylor 1996). For instance, the creation of the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can be seen as a result from a power 
battle between some industrialized countries in the north and developing countries 
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in the south. An important aspect of the Kyoto Protocol was the understandable 
refusal of developing countries to take on emission caps on the one side, and the 
Clinton Administration and Norwegian government’s belief that it is less costly to 
reduce climate gas emissions in developing parts of the world on the other side 
(MacKenzie 2009). Carbon markets, and in specific carbon forestry projects have 
met a lot of criticism with regards to asymmetrical power relations stemming from 
institutional arrangements. One of them is “land grabbing” from peasants in the 
third world. Inappropriate acquisition of land and resources for environmental 
purposes, such as carbon forestry, is generally referred to as “green grabbing”. 
The term builds on neocolonial resource estrangement in the name of the 
environment, and often refers to actions displacing the rural population in an area 
(Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012).  
 
In line with the tradition’s name, historical institutionalists focus on the role of 
historical development and view social causation as path dependent (Thelen 
1999). Political events, like the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol in 1997, occurred in a 
historical context where national leaders and scientists around the world 
acknowledged the problem of global climate change. They gathered in a summit 
to find a solution to the problem. The United States´ Clinton Administration was 
the main advocate for implementation of a market-based solution. They had good 
experience with their creation of a sulphur-dioxide trading scheme established in 
1995. The initiative resulted in cheaper and flexible efforts in reducing the 
emissions (MacKenzie 2009). Creation of carbon markets was something world 
leaders could gather around.  
 
4.2.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
With regards to the creation of carbon markets one also finds clear features in the 
negotiation process that are clearly related to the tradition of rational choice 
theorists. Rational choice institutionalism steer our attention to the role of 
strategic interaction between actors that are important to the determination of 
political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996, 951). This perspective can be defined 
“as an analysis of the choices made by rational actors under conditions of 
interdependence” (Immergut 1998, 12). Similar to historical institutionalists, they 
are absorbed by cross-national coalition behavior and the development of political 
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institutions. There are two ways to think about institutions within the rational 
choice tradition. The first view institutions as  
 
“exogenous constraints, or as an exogenously given game form…An institution is 
a script that names the actors, their respective behavioral repertoires, the sequence 
in which the actors choose from them, the information they possess when they 
make their selections, and the outcome resulting from the combination of actor 
choices. Once we add actor evaluations of outcomes to this mix – actor 
preferences – we transform the game form into a game” (Shepsle 2006, 24).  
 
In this view the creation of carbon markets is influenced and constrained by the 
involved institutions in the process, not necessarily the involved actors. The 
institutions steer information access, when participants can make their choices and 
so on. Carbon markets hence reflects what Shepsle (1979) terms as structure-
induced equilibrium.  
 
The second view on institutions within this tradition does not take institutions as 
exogenously given. The involved actors provide the “rules of the game”, meaning 
that the players set the rules. Institutions reflect the willingness actors have to 
“engage with one another according to particular patterns and procedures” 
(Shepsle 2006, 25). In the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries undertook a 
binding commitment to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to agreed quantities 
in the period of 2008-2012. The reference-level agreed upon was reductions from 
1990-levels, and is from a game-theoretical perspective one of the problems with 
the agreement. All countries have self-interest in others to maximize their 
reductions, but it is economically costly for a nation to limit their own reductions. 
The result is a tragedy of the commons-situation as described in Hardin’s work 
(1968), where global warming continues at a higher pace than wished for because 
no one wants to bear the cost of reducing their own emissions. Another parallel 
can be drawn to the famous prisoner’s dilemma, where actors do not cooperate 
even though it appears that it is in their best interest to do so. The end result is that 
all actors are worse off than they could have been if they had cooperated. The 
suboptimal outcome is neither an expression of participants’ true preferences, nor 
does the game “gather their preferences into a coherent collective outcome” 
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(Immergut 1998, 13). There is no doubt that the collective action dilemma highly 
influenced the Kyoto negotiations’ end result.  
 
Despite game theoretical problems, the quotas agreed upon got institutionalized 
into a cap and trade system where first world countries can trade carbon credits, 
called Assigned Amount Units (AAU) (Hagem and Holtsmark 2009). Perhaps 
more important was the emergence of the project-based schemes Joint 
Implementation (JI), and especially the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Certifications such as CDM and JI were created in the regulatory market, and 
alongside several voluntary carbon standards evolved. The standards in both 
markets are important with regards to transaction costs, and the relationship 
between agents and principals. It helps customers in the market identify 
differences in quality and type, and diminish the information asymmetry problem 
due to third-party certification. Because Green Resources has one CDM and one 
VCS project in Uganda, this is the focus in my investigation of the regulated and 
voluntary carbon markets.  
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Figure 7: Comparison Rational Choice and Historical Institutionalism 
(Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 7) 
4.2.3 Critical Institutionalism 
The challenging view to new institutionalism view institutions as formed in a 
necessary improvisation to challenges met in people’s daily lives. Cleaver (2012) 
term this as “Critical Institutionalism”. It challenges the rational choice view, 
emphasizing that institutions are complex and intertwined in everyday social life 
(Hall et al. 2013). An important aspect is the use of old routines and “know how” 
in new situations, or to adapt new arrangements to fit in social contexts. Even 
though institutions originally were made for simple purposes and with clear goals, 
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Typical 
research 
design 
Casual illustrations of 
hypotheses, macro-quantitative 
tests 
Historical sociology, case 
studies 
Time horizon Short term Long term 
Definition of 
institutions Rules, procedures Informal and formal rules 
Role of 
institutions 
for human 
action 
Intervening variable. Situational 
constraint and opportunity 
Intervening variable. Grown 
constraint and opportunity 
Preference 
formation 
Exogenous to the model or 
decision-theoretic explanation 
Endogenous. Creation of 
institutions affects 
preferences 
Creation of 
institutions 
Distributional conflict, 
reduction of transaction costs or 
collective dilemma as driving 
force 
Delegation; self-maintaining 
and potentially expansive 
Evolution of 
institutions 
Bargaining process, 
evolutionary selection 
Contingent processes with 
path dependency and 
unintended consequences 
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institutional bricolage is an uneven and dynamic process. The process must 
consist of familiar routines, accepted logics and must socially fit. Legitimation is 
achieved through reinvention of “authoritative meaning that “leaks” from one 
institutional domain to another” (Cleaver 2012, 2).  
 
The interplay between traditional and new, formal and informal arrangements are 
also important (Hall et al. 2013, 6).  In line with this view, institutions are shaped 
consciously and non-consciously. All people have both conscious and non-
conscious inner psychological motivations that shape behavior. We are also 
influenced by tradition, everyday routines and our moral worldview. Visible and 
invisible power relations influence the authoritative process of bricolage. 
Individual actors exercise different levels of influence in institutional creation. 
This inequality in power often stem from their social positions and influence 
formation of institutional rules (Cleaver 2012).   
 
The traditional and critical schools are not completely rivaling in their views. 
Traditional scholars emphasize efficiency and the health of the commons, while 
critical institutionalists focus on socio-economic equality and poverty reduction. 
Rules are at the center in both traditions. According to North’s tradition, rules 
exist to exclude outsiders and regulate use of resources. In Cleaver’s view, rules 
are there to enhance common access to resources. Where the traditional 
institutionalism emphasize rule making and the rules formal role, critical 
institutionalism look at differences between rules and practice. An example may 
be differences in the demands a certification requires, such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism and Voluntary Carbon Standard, and actual practice. 
Path dependency is important in historical institutionalism whereas the 
institutional bricolage-view emphasize structural historical events (Hall et al. 
2013).  
 
A typical critical institutionalist would view actors in carbon markets as 
heterogeneous. Moreover, they would seek to understand how a market actually 
function. In order to comprehend a market it is not enough to only look at the 
formal rules.  Some operate in the voluntary, others in the compliance market. 
They all have different motivation and influence. Some are in the market to 
enhance their corporate social responsibility-profiles, others are in it to comply 
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with the Kyoto Protocol. An energy company operates in another way than a 
forestry company, perhaps also with different goals. With regards to forestry, 
standards would affect stakeholders in different ways in different places. A central 
question is whether creation of new institutions leads to unintended results 
(Lesorogol 2010). If all where listed here, the list would be long. 
 
Figure 8: Comparison New Institutionalism and Critical Institutionalism 
  New Institutional Economics Critical Institutionalism 
Linkages 
between 
institutions 
Formal/public institutions in 
nested layers with horizontal 
and vertical linkages 
Blurring of boundaries and of 
scales, blending of institutional 
logics and forms (e.g. 
Formal/informal) 
Formation of 
institutions 
Institutions formed through 
design and crafting/design 
principles characterize robust 
institutions 
Institutions pieced together 
through processes of practice, 
improvisation and adaption 
Decision 
making 
happens 
Decision-making and 
negotiations mainly 
conducted in public fora 
Decision-making and 
negotiations embedded in 
everyday life, shaped by history 
and politics 
Agency is 
shaped by 
"Bounded rationality" models 
of agency as strategic and 
purposeful - individuals as 
resource appropriators 
Agency shaped consciously and 
non-consciously - individuals 
with complex social identities 
Behavior is 
shaped by 
Behavior shaped by 
incentives, rules, sanctions. 
Behavior shaped by societal 
structures, norms and practices, 
individual creativity. 
Results of 
institutionalism 
Institutions can be crafted to 
produce efficient resource 
management outcomes. 
Institutional functioning may 
produce social inclusion or 
exclusion.  
(Cleaver 2012, 16) 
 
4.3 The Role of Commercialization in Carbon Markets 
Karl Polanyi questioned economists’ view that “the existence of price-creating 
markets is natural” (Didry and Vincensini 2011, 3). Polanyi emphasized that 
commercialization of productive factors and money is among the essential 
components in the creation of an economic market. In order for agents in a market 
to be able to pursue profits through exchange, productive factors and money must 
be “free” to be bought and sold (Sánchez-Andrés and March-Poquet 2002). This 
means that actors in a market must be able to exchange the product continuously. 
Furthermore, exchange relation should cover productive factors that are important 
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for social reproduction. This means that commercialization in market creation 
should contribute to e.g. employment.  
 
Polanyi’s (1957) institutional theory emphasize that exchange relations in a 
market economic instrument within a social context, such as carbon markets, is 
dependent and determined by the existence of political willingness where states 
direct their attention toward such transformation. He also addresses the problem 
of what he calls fictitious commodities, which are labor, land and money. These 
elements are essential for industry, must be organized in markets, and are vital for 
the economic system to function. However, they are not commodities according to 
the empirical definition; none of them are produced for sale. With increasing 
industrial complexity fictitious commodities were made available for purchase. 
Through globalization, markets spread all over the world and the types of goods 
exchanged grew rapidly. Alongside the globalization of commodity exchange, a 
network of policies and measures was integrated in powerful institutions designed 
to monitor the action of markets relative to land, labor and money (Polanyi 1957). 
Carbon markets are a creation where land, or nature, is exchanged through 
financial and intergovernmental institutions.  
 
4.4 The Use of the Theories in the Analysis 
One of the main problems addressed in political economy is how we learn through 
the institutional regimes we have. Creating a market is a difficult process and 
market dysfunctions as e.g. plummeting prices illustrate this. Moreover, creation 
of new mechanisms, such certification arrangements, helps actors limit risk.  
 
Institutions not directly linked to carbon markets will influence the outcome of 
forestry carbon projects. Supranational institutional arrangements function 
alongside national and local governments and regulations. Different institutional 
arrangements may have competing motivations and incentives. These institutions 
again may be influenced by Green Resources’ policies and the certifications they 
aim to get. This may create non-intended side effects as critics has pinpointed. It 
may influence local communities and the biodiversity in an area (or even a 
country). The chapter “key findings” will be used to highlight different 
institutional arrangements and how they affect stakeholders in the market. They 
GRA 19003 - Master Thesis  02.09.2013 
Page 47 
will also be used to partly explain the outcome of Green Resources projects in 
Uganda.  
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5.0 Study Area 
This chapter presents a country profile of Uganda. It explains the country’s 
environmental challenges and the role of forestry in order for the readers to grasp 
the context in which Green Resources operate. I link the environmental challenges 
to the role of an increasing population, before analyzing the economic potential 
for carbon forestry in the country. Finally, a brief presentation of the political and 
administrative structure, especially focused on the forestry sector in the country, is 
given.  
 
5.1 Country Profile: Uganda 
Uganda is a continental country in East-Africa. It borders to South-Sudan in the 
north, DR Congo in the west, Kenya in the east, and Rwanda and Tanzania to the 
south. The country is blessed with substantial natural resources, including regular 
rainfall, fertile soils, small deposits of copper, gold and other minerals, and 
recently discovered oil (Oxford Analytica 2011b). There are few overseas export 
opportunities in the country, but the location alongside Lake Victoria and the 
White Nile makes it possible to export products, such as timber, to neighboring 
countries. The demand for timber in the region is tremendously large, and the pace 
of deforestation activities is a vast problem.  
 
This chapter will start by introducing the study area, and explain why forestry is 
important in the battle against climate change for the country. Thereafter, the role 
of an increasing population, economics and politics is presented in the light of 
environmental concerns.  
 
5.1.1 Forestry in Uganda 
Plantations are important for the country because they are seen to contribute to 
hamper the pressure on the natural forests. Since 1990, Uganda has lost 40% of its 
forest cover (World Bank 2012), and National Forestry Authority (2009) 
estimates an annual loss in forests of 1.9%
14
. The recommended forest cover for 
the country to keep a stable ecological system is 5.9 million ha, or twice the area 
                                                 
14
 This number seems conservative reviewing other reports. Estimates of 2.5% 
have been found while doing research.  
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of Albania, and the current forest cover is about 3 million ha (World Bank 2012). 
Deforestation activities are also linked to degraded
15
 water resources. In this 
regard, forests’ most important contribution to the hydrological balance of 
watershed is related to maintenance of high water quality (Hamilton 2008).  
 
Uganda is considered one of the least developed countries in the world, and the 
local population highly depends on wood products such as firewood and charcoal 
in their daily lives. In addition, the pace of the construction industry is rising 
rapidly increasing the need for timber products. As a result, Ugandan timber 
prices are among the highest in the region (Green Resources 2012).  
 
The governmental bureaus linked to forestry in Uganda have suffered from severe 
corruption scandals. NFA was originally seen as reliable and received a great deal 
of funding from industrialized countries, and especially Norway. After a big 
corruption scandal came forth, the funding stopped. The result is that NFA suffers 
from a liquidity crunch and political interference per se. Moreover, community 
engagement in forestry management is low (World Bank 2012).  
 
The National Forestry Authority (NFA), the National Environment Management 
Authority (NEMA), and other governmental institutions depend on foreign 
investments to rise the planting pace, as they lack resources to combat the 
deforestation problems themselves. Green Resources and other foreign companies 
are therefore welcomed by the Ugandan government to carry out their activities in 
the country. Carbon forestry activities demand large land areas. Most investors, 
including GRAS, obtain customary land through lease (Oxford Analytica 2011a). 
The NFA manages Central Forest Reserves (CFRs), and both GRAS plantations 
are placed within such reserves. The first CFRs were set aside for forest activities 
in the country already in 1932, during British rule. By law, no other activities are 
allowed conducted in the areas. It is NFA’s task to make sure that the land is free 
from settlement, agricultural activities and grazing cattle. Despite the rules in 
Uganda’s Forestry Act, there are settlements within Bukaleba forest reserve, and 
                                                 
15
 Degraded can be a difficult word to use because it depends on the perception of 
the person using the term. In this context degraded water resources refers to 
polluted drinking water.  
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alongside Kachung forest
16
. The problem of settlement in CFRs is common for 
investors committing business in an area-demanding sector, and private 
companies often consider acquisition of land with a clean title to be one of the 
biggest challenges. The result is challenging conditions for the company, in 
addition to the rural population settled in the areas.  
 
5.1.2 Demographics: The Role of an Increasing Population 
Uganda’s fast growing population of 3.3% is the key driver for environmental 
change in the country (NEMA 2010; Dobronogov et al. 2011). It highly affects 
the availability and renewability of natural resources, and there are tremendous 
land pressures related to the fact that 85% lives from the agricultural sector. The 
need for food, together with inefficient and poor agricultural practices is seen as 
one driver that degrades soils
17
. Additionally, removal of trees for wood-fuel is 
high, and 90% of Ugandans use firewood or charcoal as their main source of 
energy (World Bank 2012).  
 
Figure 9: Causes of deforestation 
 
Source: UBOS 2010; NFA 2006-2007 in World Bank 2012.  
                                                 
16
 There are settlements within most Central Forest Reserves in Uganda. A few 
are not inhabited, but many have ”encroachment levels” of a 100%. This 
information was given to me during my visits at NFA.  
17
Efficiency in agricultural practice is a relative term. Depending on how you 
define efficiency industrial or small-scale farming is the most efficient. In terms of 
working hours, industrialized agricultural practices are more efficient. If you 
measure how much food a farmer gets out of one hectare of land, small-scale 
agriculture is more efficient. For an article addressing this issue read Gerald Leach 
(1975) article ”Energy and food production.”  
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Even though the report referred to above cite wood fuel as one of the major 
sources for deforestation, others have more conservative estimates. Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz (1999) emphasize that this reason for deforestation is bigger in Africa 
than elsewhere, but underline that the largest source of degradation of woodland is 
expansion of cropped areas and pastures. Logging and open-pit mining are also 
worth mentioning. Resource use grows alongside people’s aspirations to improve 
their lives, and one of the results related to this study is a high deforestation level. 
Population growth and prosperity level are closely related to the country’s 
outlooks for development and well being of its people. A steady growth towards 
becoming a middle-income country depends on healthy management of the 
environment and natural resources. Uganda’s population increased from 9.5 
million in 1969 to an estimated 32.9 million in 2011 (NEMA 2010), and the 
current population growth rate is estimated at 3.32% (Central Intelligence Agency 
2013)
18
.  
 
Figure 10: The expected mid-year population growth in Uganda
19
 
(UBOS 2007) 
 
                                                 
18
 Uganda’s population has not been counted in many years, and numbers are 
based on estimates.  
19
 A chart presenting historical population growth from 1948 until 2002 is in the 
appendix. 
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5.1.3 Economics of Forestry and the Potential of Carbon Finance 
Degradation of environmental and natural resources is a drain for Uganda’s 
economy. Soil erosion and nutrient depletion has in some areas led to fatal 
landslides, and wetland areas have declined by 30% resulting in severe floods. 
Fish stocks has declined and 40% of the forest cover is gone (World Bank 2012). 
However, GDP has recovered from the disastrous regime of Idi Amin in the 
1970s. Uganda has faced a rapid economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s, with a 
growth of 9.3% from 2001-2008. In 2011, the growth rate had fallen to 3.4% 
(World Bank 2013). Inflation rates fell from 13.4% in 2009 to 7.3% in 2010 
(Oxford Analytica 2011a), but reached 23.5% in 2012 (World Bank 2013). 
Uganda was one of the fastest growing countries in the region, but now lags 
behind due to global economic turbulence combined with slippages in fiscal and 
monetary policies. There is evidence that there have been political and public 
willingness to sacrifice environmental assets to achieve increased growth. 
Environmental resources are key to income for the rural population and for the 
nation as a whole in terms of revenue from natural resource extraction (NEMA 
2010, 2). Forestry contributes 5.7% to Uganda’s GDP and is an important sector 
in terms of economy (National Forestry Authority 2009). The value of carbon 
storage in Uganda’s current forests is estimated to 1.2 billion USD (World Bank 
2012). Possibilities to get some portion of this amount from sales worldwide exist 
in the application of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation Plus (REDD+) programs, Clean Development Mechanism and 
voluntary carbon markets
20
. Weak infrastructure, poor financial services to the 
private sector, and corruption and lack of competence in public sector are major 
constraints to the country’s economical growth. These factors may also serve as a 
hinder for foreign investors and decrease their profitability. However, after the full 
liberalization of the country’s economy in 1997 financial risks remain quite low. 
Foreign investors are generally welcomed (Oxford Analytica 2011a). The 
Investment Code 1991 is a law governing investments in Uganda. Under this act 
the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) was created to facilitate the procedures 
for companies interested in investing in the country. The idea is that all investors 
                                                 
20
 Uganda is working on a national REDD+ strategy. They also have eight CDM 
certified projects (information attained from the Climate Change Unit in Ministry 
of Water and Environment (MWE) 2013). 
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have to go through the UIA, but it is likely that practice differs from rules (Oxford 
Analytica 2011b).  
 
5.1.4 Political and Administrative Structure 
The political system is fragmented and consist of 33 parties (UNDP 2013). 
Opposition parties remain fragmented, and the ruling party meet increased public 
frustration with Museveni’s growing authoritarianism (Oxford Analytica 2011a). 
Nevertheless, Uganda has clear agricultural policies, and NFA is mandated to 
control Central Forest Reserves and lease land to foreign investors. Private sector 
investment has increased as a result of NFA’s strategy to promote public-private 
partnerships through lease of CFRs. In addition to many small-scale private 
investors, three large foreign companies lease land areas: one of them is Green 
Resources.  
 
The Sawlog Production Grant Scheme (SPGS) is an initiative taken by the 
Ugandan government. The agency provides investment incentives in the forestry 
sector through financial support and technical assistance. They fund establishment 
of timber plantations and give training to small-scale actors in the country’s 
forestry sector. The Norwegian government and the European Union have funded 
SPGS, but the funding period is soon expiring
21
.  
 
Green Resources has got funding for 1000 ha of their forests from this initiative. 
Other institutions involved in forestry in the country are the Forest Sector Support 
Department  (FSSD) and District Forestry Services (DFS). The sectors’ progress 
has been slow due to inefficient public administration and high corruption levels. 
Allegations of corruption, together with rapid deforestation and a mismanaged 
public sector led to withdrawal of donor support to the sector (World Bank 2012). 
Norad was among the actors withdrawing funding to NFA after a corruption 
                                                 
21
 Norway stopped its funding in the fall 2012 as written in the chapter about 
Green Resources. Helle Biseth, a former employee at the Norwegian Embassy in 
Kampala, and now employed by the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (Norad), expressed that Norway would be hesitant to fund the project 
again because it is a project by the Ugandan government. Due to a large (non-
forestry related) corruption scandal, all state-to-state aid from Norway to Uganda 
is frozen. EU seem to focus on building infrastructure for Uganda, and there is 
large insecurity of whether they will continue their funding in the next period.  
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scandal. Another problem related to inefficient management of environmental and 
natural resources is lack of funding. Moreover, the sector needs to develop 
transparency, accountability and public involvement in cooperative management, 
in addition to securing its funding and inefficiencies (World Bank 2012).  
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6.0 Research Methods and Design 
6.1 Methodology 
The main problem discussed in this thesis is:  
 
What are the challenges of forestry carbon markets, and are they reflected in 
Green Resources’ projects in Uganda? 
 
The research strategy adopted in this thesis is mainly qualitative. Consequently, 
the thesis has been based on an inductive research approach as a rigid use of 
theories from the start on, may lead to superfluous limitations and to incorrect 
conclusions of the phenomena studied (Stenbacka 2001). By selecting Green 
Resources’ plantations in Uganda as a case study of a carbon forestry project as 
the main objective for the paper, some aspects has been included in the thesis, and 
others naturally excluded.   
 
6.1.1 Epistemological and Ontological Approaches 
Epistemology is known as the theory of knowledge. Discourses in epistemology 
discuss the social and philosophical conditions for acceptable knowledge (Bryman 
2012). A central problem in epistemology is establishing when we know and 
when we do not know something. As opposed to positivism commonly used in a 
quantitative research approach, interpretivism is normally used in qualitative 
research. Interpretivism is based on an understanding that “a strategy is required 
that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences 
and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social 
action” (Bryman 2012, 30). Hence, qualitative data is a suitable choice because it 
makes it easier to get a more detailed and in-depth picture of a phenomenon than 
quantitative data.  
 
The topic of research in this thesis is founded on the idea that anthropogenic 
global warming exists. When governments and other institutions cooperate to find 
a solution to this problem, and e.g. construct carbon markets, they simultaneously 
acknowledge the scientific relevance of the phenomenon. A central 
epistemological question in this context is what sort of knowledge that allows us 
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to draw that conclusion. Together with this, the ontological position taken was one 
of constructionism. It challenges the view that sees organizations and other social 
entities as pre-given. Constructionism implies that social phenomena are 
influenced by external factors, and that they are “produced through social 
interaction and are in constant state of revision” (Bryman 2008, 19). The 
theoretical chapter is a part of this category of research and is required since it 
provides an explanation on carbon markets origin, what drives the market, in 
addition to laying the foundation for reviewing institutional benefits and failures. 
The theoretical part also forms part of the generalizing criteria for judging 
qualitative research.  
 
6.2 Research Design 
Research design is “a framework for collecting and analyzing data” (Bryman 
2012, 46) and within the field of political economy there are several to choose 
from. For the purpose of this paper a case study design was adopted. The 
background for this choice is that the study aims to entail an in-depth study to 
understand complex issues and experiences around a specific case. A case study 
may involve several cases, but for the purpose and scope of this study, one case 
was chosen.  An abbreviated definition of case studies given by Yin (2009, 18) is 
that case studies are: ”An empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon, 
set within its real-world context – especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” There exist different types of 
case studies, and the one chosen in this paper is what (Bryman 2012) refers to as 
an exemplifying case. The concept of exemplification is used because such cases 
offer a “suitable context for certain research questions to be answered” (Bryman 
2012, 70).   
 
Green Resources’ forestry carbon project is the case and main unit of analysis in 
the thesis. It was chosen because of its uniqueness as an organization operating in 
a relatively new and highly politically constructed market. The company is one of 
few large-scale commercial forestry companies in Uganda, and the largest in 
Africa. It is supported by the Norwegian government through Norad and Norfund, 
and may represent a desirable model for how political institutions want to combat 
the global warming problem. GRAS is also distinctive because it operates within 
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both the voluntary and the regulated carbon market. Visiting both plantations laid 
an interesting basis for comparing the two markets and to see whether there exist 
differences in the way the company operates. It also helped me understand the 
complexities of the different institutional arrangements they work under, and if 
these arrangements are conflicting. Collection of both primary and secondary data 
from investors and customers of the company contributed to an understanding of 
the interorganizational partnerships. The case is a supreme way in looking at the 
way carbon markets operate on the ground and investigate institutional benefits 
and failures. It is important to mention that the study is limited to one geographic 
area and sector by researching a carbon forestry project.  
 
6.2.1 Generalization 
Many academics claim that generalization from a study is important in science in 
order for a research project to have some value. This has been debated in 
academic writings, and case studies have often been criticized for not having a 
generalizable value. In this regard it is important to remember that most studies 
cannot generalize to a whole population or different contexts (Gillham 2010). 
Such generalization is not the purpose of this analysis as the case is unique. Yin 
(2012) emphasize that it is possible to generalize analytically, but not statistically 
from a case study. “Analytic generalization from a case study depends on the 
theoretical framework to establish a logic that might be applicable to other 
situations” (Yin 2012, 18).  
 
The point of choosing a case study method is to relate findings to literature and 
theories, rather than generalizing to other situations and institutions. “Cases 
embody causal processes operating in microcosm” (Walton 1992, 122). They 
demonstrate how general social dynamics take form and produce results in 
particular settings. By studying a carbon forestry project in Uganda, I go from 
studying a tiny piece of the carbon markets in relation to the market as a whole. 
The project is based on theoretical generality reviewing institutionalism, 
neoliberalism and carbon markets. In this respect, I use the theories to highlight 
my findings. I also look into local factors influencing the outcome of Green 
Resources’ carbon forestry projects. The study is influenced by situational 
groundedness (Harper 1992). With situational groundedness comes the matter of 
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complexity. The aim of a case study, including this one, is to grasp a complex 
picture of a specific case. This goal is often in conflict with the one of generality 
(Ragin 1987).  
 
The case study of GRAS is interesting in this regard as carbon credits from 
forestry projects is a debated field. The findings provide indications of whether 
carbon credits from forestry projects are a viable and sustainable alternative in the 
future. Moreover, it shows the institutional costs and benefits at micro level in 
Uganda, in addition to insights in thoughts of customers and investors in the 
market. It is interesting to see how the largest carbon forestry company in Africa 
operates. This may provide insight into political, environmental and economic 
aspects of such a solution to climate change. There is a possibility that forestry 
projects in certain parts of the world face similar challenges.  
 
Most importantly, carbon markets prove to be one of the newest politically 
constructed markets in the world. It is recognized as a financial instrument and 
comparisons with regards to the construction of other new financial inventions can 
be drawn
22
. New markets will develop and some knowledge from the construction 
of this market might prove applicable in new situations. As mentioned above, the 
case of Uganda is unique in many ways. The company’s operations in Uganda are 
running, and there are not any plans of expanding the scope of these due to 
difficulties experienced in the existing ones. This is not the case for the operations 
in Tanzania, and the operations in Mozambique are seen as top priority to expand. 
Green Resources has its own procedures in running their business, making it 
difficult to generalize fully to other firms in the same segment. However, this case 
study may help gaining a more complete picture on the topic researched.  
 
The presence of similar forestry and carbon-offset companies operating in Uganda 
offers an opportunity to do a comparative study of GRAS and other companies’ 
operations. Since GRAS has two plantations in Uganda, the choice fell on 
investigating these more thoroughly. I also chose to look at the investors and 
                                                 
22
 The creation of financial markets and new financial instruments has drawn a lot 
attention from the public after the outburst of the financial crisis in 2008. This is 
often used as an example of how difficult it can be to create, monitor and regulate 
new markets.  
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customers of this specific company, and thereby excluded others. The choice was 
also based on time and money constraints.  
 
6.2.3 Transparency 
Reliability is often claimed to be necessary for a study to have some value. A 
study is reliable when the “operations of a study, such as data collection 
procedures, can be repeated with the same results” (Yin 2009, 40). In the case of 
GRAS’ specific carbon forestry project, I see it more important to emphasize 
transparency. Transparency is important in qualitative research because it makes it 
easier to understand what I actually did and how I arrived at my conclusions 
(Bryman and Bell 2011). Most interviews are transcribed, and all interview 
questions are written down in order to make it easier to grasp how the study was 
conducted. Moreover, type of organizations and people interviewed are expressed 
clearly. Few studies are conducted within the exact same topic as this thesis. 
However, other studies have investigated parts of Green Resources and the carbon 
markets’ aspects, and have found similar patterns and results as in this paper.  
 
6.3 Data Collection 
 The investigation of contexts and complex conditions is an important part to 
understand a case. Consequently, the relevant case study data are likely to come 
from various sources of relevance (Yin 2012).  Due to the research strategy, 
methods and design of this study, data collection came from primary and 
secondary sources. The research conducted in this study stems from fieldwork 
carried out in Uganda in 2013, where I performed semi-structured interviews, 
more informal conversations, document reviews and direct observation. After 
Uganda, semi-structured interviews were conduced in Norway with key persons 
from the Financial and Environmental Ministries, Norad, Norfund, researchers 
working with climate change and carbon markets, journalists, GRAS’ public 
investors and customers, and NGOs. Documents were collected for review on 
views of the company studied. Additionally, literature review on the market and 
company were conducted from Internet, reports, books, brochures and other 
interesting documents. I chose these methods because it fits the objective and 
purpose of the study; in addition to meeting the standards of construct validity.  
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6.3.1 Interviews 
Open-ended or semi-structured interviews can often offer richer and more in-
depth material than data from questionnaires. They sometimes last in 
conversational form for several hours and consist of conversations with different 
people during a whole day (Yin 2012). Semi-structured interviews are good 
because they consist of standardized questions as well as a more flexible format, 
ultimately leading to more open interviews that allow interviewees to give their 
own reflections. During the seven-day fieldwork in the plantations, I took notes 
and recordings. The format of this type of interviews allowed the case study 
participants to reason around reality and think about situations, not simply answer 
the questions that I asked. To ensure that some of the key questions were 
answered, I chose to use different interview guides for different purposes and 
interview objects. The result was more in-depth knowledge and understanding of 
the phenomenon studied.  
 
Bias may arise in interview situation due to poorly articulated questions (Yin 
2009). The questions that I used in the interviews in this paper were chosen as a 
result of extensive literature review on the field, reports about the company, and 
own observations and experiences. Therefore, they should be sufficiently thought 
through. Second, response bias may arise from the respondents as they wish to 
give another impression of the situation than is the case. This may stem from 
reflexivity of the interviewer, a wish to make a situation look more beneficial or 
fear of sanctions in some form. Another form of response bias may occur because 
of rosy retrospective memories and simply poor recall. To obstruct bias occurring 
in the analysis I used various contradictory sources, and time was given to the 
interviewees to think through different situations. Seven days, however, is a short 
period of time, and it is possible that some respondents gave me answers based on 
tactical evaluations.  
 
The interview strategy differed in different situations. In the villages some 
interviews took place with several participants due to convenience and 
understanding of the collective perception of this case. There were always two-
three main speakers, but it allowed them to get input from the others in their 
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native languages to make sure that the topics were properly addressed. This 
contributed to a greater understanding of the benefits and inconveniences carbon 
plantations give the local people. Moreover, it gave me insight in what rural 
people can win and gain when foreign investors invest in their local sphere. Not 
all people are aware of what resources they actually hold, especially not what it is 
worth. Further, they may not have insight in what economic benefits they are 
missing because of their lack of resources. The last point of interest is the 
knowledge I obtained about the peoples’ general living conditions, and how they 
get expressed when global entrepreneurs conduct business in their areas. The use 
of a case study method with interviews helps to explain this background.  
 
Since the case appertain institutional benefits and costs in a carbon forestry 
project, it was important to visit the National Forestry Authority (NFA), local 
environmental authorities, Green Resources’ office in Jinja, non-governmental 
organizations, journalists and researchers to get a complete picture of the 
importance of forestry carbon projects in Uganda, and the risks it comes with. 
Most of the interviews were conducted at offices with one interviewee, and some 
of them were conducted in collaboration with Hanne Dihle whom I travelled to 
Uganda with.  My partner and I did all the plantation fieldwork together as it was 
easier and less costly for both of us. She was writing about Green Resources’ 
impact on local societies in Uganda, and hence had another agenda and angle on 
her work than me.  
 
6.3.2 Direct Observation 
Doing direct observations in a field setting is one of the most distinctive features 
in case studies, and were conducted to supplement the interviews with villagers 
(Yin 2012). The main goal of visiting GRAS’ plantations was to get a holistic, 
neutral and factual view on their business and how it affected the environment 
around them. Documentation of institutional failures and benefits was 
materialized in photos and digital recordings. Generally, problems may arise when 
relying on direct observations. If a meeting or visit is announced, people can 
adjust their behavior and customize their routines to give an impression beneficial 
for them. We overcame this problem by not announcing our visits before arriving 
at the villages. The consequence was that the local people did not have enough 
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time to adjust their daily lives significantly. We did, however, get feedback from 
one of the villages that it could have been useful for them to get a notice in 
advance so that they could think through the plantations issues and benefits to 
better answer our interview questions.  
 
6.3.3 Document Review 
I used information collected in different channels, such as newspapers, company 
reports and official reports, in the study. This data has mainly been qualitative, but 
with some numbers and figures. The most important use of documents in case 
studies is to document and widen evidence from other resources (Yin 2009). 
Archival data can be biased or subject to other limitations (Yin 2012). It is 
important to remember that every researcher has limitations in their work. This 
has been evident when interviewing informants that have written about the 
company earlier. Still, reviewing resources written by different authors from 
sources with different views on the subject help combat the problem and make the 
picture more balanced.  
 
6.4 Challenges in Conducting Qualitative Research and Ethical 
Considerations 
Researching a topic offers great challenges related to the chosen design and 
practicalities. The most common criticism of qualitative research is its subjective 
character. The researcher should ideally act neutrally and face the topic with an 
open mind. Whether this is possible is discussable, as every person naturally is 
influenced by her own perceptions and understandings of topics. To remain 
objective it is therefore important to challenge own thoughts and investigate 
contradictory indications (Yin 2012). Collecting data material from a variety of 
sources with diverse views on both the company and the market helped me 
overcome the problem. Another critique is the one about generalization and 
weaknesses related to observation and interviews that are discussed above. In 
addition to the methodological challenges some practical obstacles occurred. 
 
Generally, I used the best data material available within the given timeframe I had 
to perform this study. Obstacles that occurred during the data collection hindered 
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me in getting hold of all material desired. Hence, the thesis got a different angle 
than I initiated in my preliminary thesis
23
. Nevertheless, I carried out more than 
fifty interviews in both Norway and Uganda. When searching for informants I did 
my best to choose people from different segments and sectors. I approached 
people from the governments in Uganda and Norway, rural people living in or 
right outside of the plantations investigated, carbon markets analysts, Norwegian 
and Ugandan researchers, NGOs and journalists, Green Resources offices in 
London and Uganda, and GRAS’ customers and their investors. Some of the 
informants declined my inquiry, but many said yes. Moreover, I used a variety of 
documents and observation to triangulate my data and get a complementary 
picture of the research topic.  
 
6.4.1 Information Access 
The first and most important limiting the substance in my thesis was Green 
Resources’ head office reluctance to cooperate and hand out information. It is not 
a secret that it is challenging to engage in forestry carbon business in Uganda, and 
that business leaders face tremendous time constraints. However, transparency is 
important in such a sector. On the one hand, Green Resources does not do 
themselves a favor holding back information for students, researchers, NGOs and 
journalists interested in their company because of criticism they have faced 
earlier. The company operates in a developing country where many reviewers of 
their business will be engaged in how they conduct their business. Investigations 
from local actors in Uganda, in addition to international research will be carried 
out. That said, GRAS might have different incentives for holding back 
information, ranging from deviation between stated and actual business practices, 
to lack of resources. Furthermore, holding back information may be a strategy to 
minimize their costs of consequences appearing from criticism they may face. 
Dealing with criticism is a time consuming process, and it may influence their 
budgets in a variety of ways.   
 
 Surprisingly, it proved difficult to get hold of the private investors and customers. 
All private investors approached chose to decline my inquiry about an interview 
about their motivation for investing in the market, and their evaluation of Green 
                                                 
23
 The preliminary thesis is attached at the back of this document.  
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Resources. One may assume that the companies have different reasons for 
choosing not to cooperate. Perhaps the most obvious is risk of handing out 
information. All companies have different strategies when investing, and they 
may suffer economic losses by handing out information they perceive as sensible. 
Another is time constraint. Only speculating, a third reason may be that there exist 
an agreement with Green Resources that no one is supposed to hand out 
information to others about their business in any way.  
 
The same problems did not occur in relation to the public sector or with any of the 
researchers, NGOs and journalists. There are different reasons for that. First of all, 
the public sector has disclosure requirements demanding them to hand out 
information to the public. Additionally, they may be interested in getting new 
perspectives and inputs they may obtain during an interview session. The last 
point is obviously one reason why the NGOs and journalists chose to cooperate. A 
last motive can be one of pure altruism. People like to help others and think it is 
nice to help researchers that conduct their studies.  
 
6.4.2 Time Constraints 
Another challenge was time constraints. One month was spent in Uganda, and that 
is limiting in order to understand the scope of the complexity related to 
institutional benefits and disadvantages in forestry carbon markets. “African time” 
is a well-deserved description of why one month is short and it took a lot of time 
to arrange and conduct interviews. Yet, the guide we used on the plantations was 
highly flexible and adjusted himself effectively so that much could be done within 
a short period. Arranging some of the meetings before actually travelling down to 
Kampala, in addition to being two cooperating in arranging meetings, proved 
helpful to overcome the time crunch. That said all institutions and persons 
approached in Uganda chose to participate in the study.  
 
6.4.3 Language Barriers and the Use of a Local Guide 
Language was another challenge. Since Uganda is a former British colony many 
have knowledge of English, but in a few cases an interpreter was needed. Due to 
advice from another researcher, a local radio journalist was used as guide, driver 
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and interpreter. He had a Masters degree in Journalism and had done extensive 
journalistic research on the plantation in Bukaleba for Uganda Radio Network. 
The advantage in using him was that he knew the community, who to talk to and 
how to approach the different people. Moreover his command of English was very 
good and he had done similar assignments before. One disadvantage in using him 
was that he had his points of view on the situation. However, he acted neutrally 
and introduced people with different perspectives on the topic. He was less 
familiar with the plantation and surroundings in Kachung, but he had some 
contacts and knew enough of the Leb-Lango, the local language, to ask his way 
around. As the local languages differ between the two areas of where the 
plantations are located locals in villages with knowledge of English also 
functioned as interpreters. In this respect a disadvantage is that misunderstandings 
may arise as well as misinterpretations. The problem was overcome by asking 
questions if anything was unclear and crosschecking by asking the questions 
again. I took notes and recordings to highlight the discussed topics of interest. 
Most of these recordings are transcribed and those that are not have been listened 
to afterwards at several occasions to identify common topics and other elements 
of interest. The stay in Uganda lasted four weeks in February 2013 and allowed 
for enough time to get an overview of the chosen case. After returning to Norway 
further interviews were conducted with representatives from the above-mentioned 
institutions.  
 
6.4.4 Ethics 
During fieldwork it was especially important to play with open cards. 
Interviewees in both Norway and Uganda were informed about the purpose of the 
study and their right to remain anonymous. Furthermore, I put emphasis on 
interviewees participating on the basis of informed consent. It was not the first 
time visitors, such as researchers and journalists, came to the area to investigate 
the impact the company placed on local villagers in Bukaleba and Kachung. In 
addition, some knew our local guide because of his frequent visits to the area. It is 
possible that this eased the job to get hold of volunteer informants. Some villagers 
had expectations about the contribution of the research, and a few shared a hope 
that it could help improve their situation. It was important to explain that the 
research was a master thesis, and that it would be published in an academic 
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database. Hence, the impact is limited compared to other forms of publication. 
Informants were further informed that the thesis would be distributed 
electronically to the interested interviewees.  
 
Whether small gifts should be distributed to informants or not is a debated field. 
Some emphasize that respondents use their spare time to answer your questions, 
and therefore should get a small compensation. I chose not to distribute gifts to 
the informants. There are two reasons for this. The first is based upon a wish that 
the interviewees would speak out of free will. This issue is not of importance in 
Norway or in any of the governmental institutions in Uganda, but the people in 
the villages are poor. Distributing gifts could lead to participation of people not 
relevant for the study. Additionally it could make participants that originally did 
not want to participate do so in order to get the benefit. Perhaps most importantly, 
giving gifts is controversial because it may lead the informants to give the 
researcher the answers they believe you want. Nevertheless, one local village 
chief got a small amount of money after the interview because he asked for it. 
Even though informants generally did not get any gifts, most people were willing 
to take their time for an interview. It seemed like the villagers wanted to 
contribute and that it was particularly important for them to express how they 
wanted their relationship with GRAS to improve.  
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7.0 Key Findings  
Based on the theoretical considerations outlined in the previous chapters, this 
chapter describes and discusses the findings and results from the research 
conducted in Uganda and Norway. The analysis is based on the best material I 
was able to obtain on the topic. Carbon forest markets cover many interesting 
aspects, but I had stick to answering a limited set of research questions. Therefore, 
many noteworthy aspects of the market and Green Resources as a case are 
excluded from the analysis. My findings are based on observations, interviews 
and literature found during the process I have spent on writing the thesis. 
Consequently, these limitations of the study need to be considered when reading 
the analysis. The first section aims to answer three of these research questions: 
 
1. Why has carbon forestry projects been more successful in voluntary than 
regulatory carbon markets? 
2. What influence prices in the two markets? Are there any differences 
between the voluntary and regulatory markets? 
3. What role do certifications play in voluntary and compliance carbon 
markets?  
 
Going through these mechanisms, one sees that the voluntary and compliance 
carbon markets to a great extent are influenced by the same dynamics. Features of 
new institutionalism, with focus on policy processes, highly influence market 
outcomes. However, critical institutionalism and notions from neoliberal thinking 
is also important to explain how carbon markets are functioning.  
 
The creation of carbon markets has effects on macro- and micro level. It is 
important to look into and learn from the outcome of market processes at both 
levels. Economic theory does sometimes work in a market situation. However, 
they do not always include the costs of micro-level effects. The next two sections 
looks more into Green Resources as a case, and aims to answer the last research 
question 
4. What socio-economic influence can carbon forestry projects have on local 
populations? Do other institutional arrangements influence how a carbon 
forestry company works? 
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7.1 The Success of Carbon Forestry in the Voluntary Carbon 
Market Relative to the Compliance Carbon Market 
In terms of value and volume, carbon forestry projects have been more successful 
in voluntary than in the compliance markets. There are a variety of reasons for 
this, but the most important is regulatory constraints from the international 
community. Rational choice institutionalism draw our attention to the role of 
strategic interaction between actors that is important to the determination of 
political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996, 951). Hence, political outcomes are a 
result “of the choices made by rational actors under interdependence” (Immergut 
1998, 12). Inclusion of forestry in carbon markets can be seen as a result of 
processes similar to the ones described by rational choice institutionalists.  
 
The Clean Development Mechanism was made as a result of climate negotiations. 
Therefore, governments with different views on commodification of carbon 
influence the outcome. Different perspectives on the creation of a global carbon 
market clash. International negotiations with the focus on forestry carbon projects 
were introduced with the presentation of the REDD+ mechanism in 2008. An 
estimated 3000 billion tons of CO2 equivalents are stored in forests across the 
world. Between 5 to 10 billion tons are released every year from deforestation and 
degradation of woodlands (Simonet, Bouculat and Olivera 2012, 2). Some 
governments, including Norway, believe that a forest carbon market comprising 
REDD+ can be a viable and efficient alternative to combat climate change. Other 
states, especially South-American countries such as Bolivia, dislike the thought of 
institutionalizing “mother nature” into a market24. In addition to local beliefs, the 
skepticism may be explained by historic political path dependency. A large share 
of South America has been supportive of socialist ideologies, and this is evident 
even today. In climate debates, different cultures and mindsets can be clearly 
observed, and is an important feature when creating international markets
25
.  
 
There are also other disagreements between countries related to carbon forestry 
activities. Some view it as a good solution to the climate problem, while others 
see it as a sovereignty problem that the international community is to monitor 
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land-based activities in a country. Furthermore, skepticism towards foreign 
investment in the sector exists. This issue is closely related to the development of 
REDD and the inclusion of REDD under the CDM. One country that is supportive 
of REDD is Norway. Norway is also one of the largest contributors to the REDD 
budget
26
. Brazilian politicians are skeptical towards the idea that countries should 
get paid to preserve and plant forests
27
. This is related to sovereignty issues, 
because it allows for other states (and businesses) to go into a country and 
purchase or rent a piece of land for a certain period of time. Generally, Brazil has 
been one of the countries highly engaged in the CDM market. They are, however, 
hesitant to include Land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities.   
 
Rational choice institutionalism emphasize that exogenous constraints set for 
carbon forestry projects influence project developers’ behavior and decisions in 
the market. In other words, carbon forestry markets are influenced and constrained 
by the involved institutions in the process, not necessarily the involved actors. A 
result is few carbon forestry projects certified under the Clean Development 
Mechanism; only 0.8% of all CDM projects are forestry projects (Simonet, 
Bouculat and Olivera 2012). One of the reasons for this is that restrictions were 
put on forestry carbon credits in the Kyoto negotiations. Currently, only forestry 
projects recognized as afforestation/reforestation projects are included in CDM. 
One reason for the constraint is that it can be harder to control forestry projects 
than for example energy projects. You find the problem of defining baselines in 
both project types, but with forestry you also have the problem of permanence
28
. 
Also, some claim it is easier to provoke land conflicts with local populations 
because forestry projects require vast areas of land. Therefore, forest projects are 
politically more delicate
29
. Green Resources’ project in Bukaleba Central Forest 
Reserve is one project that has been subject to such criticism
30
.  
 
A different problem for A/R CDM is that the demand is low. The main reason for 
this is that credits under this certification is not recognized and sold in the largest 
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carbon trade scheme that exist, namely the EU ETS
31
. A press release from the 
EU show that they do not want to include forestry credits into their trading 
scheme because national policies aimed at reducing deforestation are likely to 
target different stakeholders. Furthermore, they emphasize that land tenure rights 
are often unclear. Both of these issues are related to the work on reducing 
deforestation (European Union 2008). Another obstacle for the A/R CDM market 
is temporary credits. Temporary credits make the projects less attractive
32
. When 
actors purchase temporary Certified Emission Reductions (tCER), they will have 
to renew the credits purchased after a certain period. A result is lower prices for 
A/R CDM than for other CDM credit, which again makes it less attractive to 
invest in these projects
33
. tCERs bought after 2010 can be used in the next 
commitment period that lasts until 2020. The ones bought before this will have to 
be renewed or replaced in the second period
34
.  
 
Temporary credits and complex rules are the sources of financial, administrative 
and institutional problems connected to CDM. Nevertheless, rules and monitoring 
lay the foundation for institutionalizing carbon markets. This is related to 
transferability, ownership and use of the products (Rose-Ackerman 1985). A set 
of rules and systems of monitoring are set up in both the regulatory and the 
voluntary carbon markets. 
 
Since the international negotiations, carbon forestry projects have been quite 
successful in voluntary carbon markets. Carbon forest projects are often divided in 
three project types; avoided deforestation and degradation (REDD), Improved 
Forest Management (IFM) and Afforestation/Reforestation (A/R). Green 
Resources operate mainly within the A/R segment. Carbon credits from REDD 
projects are currently included in the voluntary carbon market, and is the main 
prospective source for forestry carbon finance. In 2010, 45% of all credits sold in 
voluntary markets were related to land-based projects, 29% were related to REDD 
projects (Peters-Stanley et al. 2011). One reason why more forestry projects have 
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participated in the voluntary carbon market has been simpler reporting 
requirements
35
. Green Resources state in their company report that “the 
requirements for each market are quite different” (Green Resources 2012, 34). 
This does not necessarily say anything about the quality of these projects
36
.  
 
CDM projects were thought to dominate the carbon forestry market, but the 
voluntary has shown better long-term prospects. Forestry carbon projects provide 
a large opportunity for Africa, but are viewed to be the most difficult CDM 
projects to implement. In terms of volume and number of projects, forest carbon 
succeeds better in voluntary markets than in regulatory. This might change. Often 
voluntary carbon markets serve as a testing ground for future compliance markets. 
Or as critical institutionalists would put it “institutions are pieced together through 
processes of practice, improvisation and adaption” (Cleaver 2012, 16). Some 
regional carbon markets have already recognized and integrated forest projects. 
Examples are New Zealand, New South Wales (Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Scheme) in the United States and Eastern Canada (GGRS). It is expected that 
California and Australia will follow the same trend (Simonet, Bouculat and 
Olivera 2012).  
 
By February 2013, eight A/R CDM projects, in addition a variety of voluntary 
projects were registered
37
. Moreover, the Ugandan National Forestry Authority 
(NFA) has prepared a REDD Readiness Preparation Proposal handed in to the 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility in 2011. They are currently working on 
guidelines for subnational activities and a few pilots have been established
38
. 
Other options for engagement in carbon markets are engagement in the voluntary 
and regulatory markets. Three multinational companies are engaged in carbon 
forestry in Uganda: Green Resources from Norway, British New Forests 
Company and German Global Woods. Global Woods has obtained the voluntary 
Carbon Fix Standard. New Forests Company got CDM in one of their forests in 
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2011
39
. Green Resources is engaged in both the VCM and CDM markets in 
Bukaleba and Kachung, respectively (Green Resources 2012). They state “carbon 
finance is an integral revenue stream for all Green Resources’ projects...Green 
Resources is regarded as world leader in forestry based carbon” (Green Resources 
2012, 21).  
 
Regulatory constraints and different cultural views forest carbon projects in the 
climate negotiations are the main reasons why carbon projects have been more 
successful in the voluntary carbon market. In addition, a variety of other 
mechanisms summarized in the figure below, help explain the relative success of 
carbon forestry in voluntary compared to regulatory carbon markets.  
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Figure 11: Summary of differences between the voluntary and regulatory carbon 
markets  
  
Voluntary Carbon 
Market 
Regulatory Carbon 
Market 
Carbon forestry's relative 
success High Low 
Forestry as share of the market Ca. 45%  ca. 0,8%  
Regulated mainly by… Market mechanisms International regulations 
Prices are a function of Trends in the society 
Policies set by 
governments 
Certifications 
Voluntary, but 
necessary to express 
product quality Mandatory 
Inclusion of REDD Yes No 
Customer base Mainly private/NGO Mainly public 
Development costs 
High/depending on the 
standard Very high 
Limitation of type of forest 
project No 
Yes, only A/R is 
included 
Level of bureaucracy Moderate High 
Transparency of validation 
process Low (VCS) High 
Focus on sustainable 
development No (VCS) Yes 
Strong focus and well-developed 
methods for measurement of 
carbon capture Yes (VCS) Yes 
External validators Yes (VCS) Yes 
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7.2 Price Mechanisms in the two Carbon Markets 
Both the voluntary and compliance carbon markets’ prices are primarily 
influenced by demand and supply
40
. Demand and supply in the markets are 
influenced by many factors, and there are a few differences between voluntary and 
compliance markets. These are presented after the brief reminder of the necessary 
preconditions of commodification of products.  
 
Karl Polanyi questioned economists’ view that “the existence of price-creating 
markets is natural” (Didry and Vincensini 2011, 3). He emphasized that 
commercialization of productive factors and money is among the essential 
components in the creation of an economic market. In order for agents in a market 
to be able to pursue profits through exchange, productive factors and money must 
be “free” to be bought and sold (Sánchez-Andrés and March-Poquet 2002). 
Commodification of carbon forest credits is therefore essential for this market to 
function. Linked to the process of commodifying forest carbon credits (and credits 
from other projects), governance systems created for other purposes have been 
incorporated in the market (Boyd, Boykoff and Newell 2011). These systems 
influence carbon prices in the market.  
 
On average, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) have been more expensive 
than VERs. The reason why CDM currently is cheaper than voluntary carbon 
credits is that CDM has larger volumes than expected. At the same time, the 
demand for the credits has gone down. CDM prices hit record low levels in 2012, 
and you could buy a CER for 0,60 Euro in December 2012. The highest price was 
slightly above 5 Euros. In comparison, the average price was 8,3 Euros in 2011, 
and 9,2 Euros in 2010 (Statens Energimyndighet 2013). Forest credits in the CDM 
market have generally been cheaper than other CDM projects. This has lead to a 
reluctance of investment in these projects compared to other
41
.  
 
Moreover, the fact that emission caps for a given period is fixed, in addition to 
insecurity about emission caps for future commitment periods, influence prices 
significantly. This makes the prices less stabile than they would normally be if 
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investors could foresee endurance in the market despite sequentially divided 
periods negotiated through climate negotiations. 
 
One of the main reasons behind the market failure related to CDM was that the 
mechanism was launched during a period of economic growth in the industrialized 
part of the world. Before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, there was a 
demand for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). When the crisis broke out, 
this demand plummeted. Since it takes time to verify and validate CDM projects, 
many projects that were initiated before the crisis, could not deliver the CERs 
before after the crisis hit
42
. This contributed to an overflow of CERs in the market 
at a time where the demand had gone down.  
 
Figure 12: Demonstration on how demand has gone down at the same time as 
supply has gone up in the CDM market  
 
Source: CDM Policy Dialogue (Lang 2012) 
 
The largest market, EU ETS, has been steering the prices. Generally, CDM prices 
have been a bit lower because of the bureaucracy related to the 
verification/validation process
43
. The CDM Executive Board has accomplished 
some changes in the system to ease the bureaucracy
44
.  
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Figure 13: Historical CDM and EU ETS prices confirming the statement above 
 
Source: Jotzo (2012)
45
 
 
Another reason for low CDM prices is that Kyoto 2 is not more ambitious with 
regards to its goals and achievements than Kyoto 1
46
. One of the markets 
demanding fewer credits is as mentioned above, the European. The financial crisis 
is not the only factor reducing demand in this area. Because prices are a function 
of policies set by governments, the EU 2020 goals with focus on renewable 
energy influence the price mechanism
47
. EU has built the largest institution in the 
carbon market and will reform this in 2013. Inclusion of forestry credits will be 
evaluated after 2020. Therefore, CDM A/R prices are likely to remain low.  
 
Despite the creation of the carbon markets’ largest institutions, EU’s policies 
undermine the functioning of the current market. The reason is that they steer their 
politics into a “low carbon” economy48. A revision of their current carbon trade 
scheme is therefore necessary for it to function. EU’s focus on development of 
renewable energy projects, in addition to new ways to reduce emissions in the 
industry, explains a large share of the decreased demand in the market
49
. The two 
last points can be seen to be in line with the neoliberal argument that informed 
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entrepreneurs will adapt to accurate price signals by shifting investment away 
from environmentally harmful to environmentally beneficial business solutions 
(Lohmann 2009). Moreover, it may show that behavior in the market is shaped by 
incentives, rules and sanctions as new institutionalists emphasize. In this view, the 
carbon market is serving its purpose in giving incentives to reduce emissions and 
steer investments towards greener technologies. This leads, however, to a demand 
for politically renew the premises for the market to function properly. On the 
other hand, a shift in investments may be a result of changes in policies.  
 
One policy change made by the CDM Executive Board is exclusion of credits 
from certain project types. The exclusion of HFC (hydro fluorocarbon) projects 
from CDM has contributed to lower prices because is led to a rapid increase of 
such credits in the market before their expiration. These credits cannot be sold or 
bought anymore
50
. Many of the HFC projects were implemented early in the 
CDM era because of the large environmental effect these projects had. Many of 
these projects were realized in India and China. Examples of such projects are the 
Gujarat Flourochemicals Ltd in India and Jiangsu Meilan Chemical CO Ltd in 
China (Climate Connect 2013). An exclusion of HFC CDM credits may be a step 
towards “greening” of compliance markets and can be viewed as a positive step 
for the mechanism (Simonet, Bouculat and Olivera 2012). The goal with CDM is 
to find the cheapest and most cost saving method to reduce carbon emissions. The 
focus on efficiency in reductions channeled resources into certain emission 
reducing projects. Hence, new institutional theorists focus on behavior in a market 
is shaped by incentives fit. A consequence is that it takes attention away from 
other projects
51
.  
 
Increased supply and decreased demand, in addition to the abovementioned 
factors certainly show that there is a need for a revision of international 
regulations in the CDM market in order to make it function. The set of laws and 
regulations first initiated in the Kyoto negotiations do not hold if the current 
market is to function.  
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One of the main problems, however, stem from the same negotiations. By 2012, 
“Annex 1”52 countries accepted binding constraints meaning that they agreed to 
buy emission credits when their emissions were higher than the 5,2% reduction 
from the 1990 levels. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union emission 
reductions in former Soviet states were diminished by 40% due to disclosure of 
many polluting factories (Bond 2012). This lead to excess permits where these 
states could sell credits in the market without actually lowering their own 
emissions. In that respect, Russia is the most important country
53
. Because of the 
excess credits from Eastern Europe the supply is artificially high, and leads to 
lower prices. Some of the excess credits commonly referred to as “hot air”, from 
Russia, will not be sold in Kyoto 2. The reason is that Russia chose not to sign the 
agreement.  
 
Despite plummeting CDM prices, there has been increased demand for African-
sourced credits. This may show that the global demand is differentiated demand 
between different continents and regions. Some actors pay more for forest carbon 
credits in compliance markets relative to other projects
54
, and forest-based credits 
has grown to the second largest source of purchased credits in the voluntary 
carbon market. Green Resources has one CDM certified plantation in Kachung 
and one certified under the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) in Bukaleba. 
GRAS’ managing director in Uganda, Isaac Kapalaga, confirmed that prices in the 
CDM market currently are lower than in voluntary
55
. Despite this, the company 
got higher than average prices for CDM in 2012, while their VCS credits was sold 
for average prices (Green Resources 2012). Nevertheless, it is more economically 
beneficial for investors to invest in the best certifications in the voluntary carbon 
market offers, compared to the regulatory. Even though prices decreased in the 
voluntary carbon market after the outburst of the financial crisis in 2008, they 
seem to be more stable than in the compliance market. One of the reasons for this 
is that customers’ motivation to purchase credits in this market differs from the 
main motivation in the regulatory market.  
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Most public actors primarily buy certifications through the UN system in order to 
fulfill their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol
56
. Even though they can 
purchase Verified Emission Reductions (VERs) in the voluntary market, many 
governments do not engage in this. This can be seen as a consequence of the rules, 
incentives and sanctions that lay the foundation for compliance markets. Another 
reason for this is that CDM certification is seen to offer quality reassurances 
57
. 
When emissions are reduced due to lowered economic activity, public actors 
naturally demand fewer credits than normal. Hence, demand for CERs goes down.  
 
The customer base is slightly different in the voluntary market
58
. A significant 
share of the purchase of VERs in this market stems from businesses, non-profit 
organizations and individuals. Hence, the motivation stems from other sources 
than obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. Most forest carbon transactions happen 
in voluntary markets and show that the main motivations for buying offsets are 
CSR goals and marketing. Behavior in this market may therefore be influenced 
more by social structures and individual creativity. The motivation probably 
differs between non-profit actors and for-profit actors as well.  
 
Prices in carbon markets follow general market principles. The prices increase as 
credits move up the value chain from project developers all the way to the end 
users (Peters-Stanley, Hamilton and Yin 2012). There was a distinction between 
the regulated and the voluntary markets; in voluntary markets, developers traded 
the largest volumes directly with end-users to prices below average, and smaller 
volumes to secondary markets for a somewhat higher price than average.  
 
Compared to CDM, where there is one certification for forestry projects (A/R 
CDM), there are many forestry certifications in the voluntary markets. A 
consequence is more competition on quality, and not only prices. There exist a 
few “gourmet” alternatives in the market that are highly recognized59,60. If the 
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market did not pay for the higher quality products the providers of such projects 
would lose their competitiveness. In accordance with rational choice theory, this 
would lead to a “race-to-the-bottom” because the customer is not aware of quality 
differences with regards to socio-economic impact and rigidity of carbon storage. 
The high recognition of the best alternatives in the market also shows that 
branding is important. Social inclusion of these certification mechanisms in the 
market is therefore key for it to function. In order to gain value in public relations 
work, it is necessary to show use of the best certifications. Nevertheless, higher 
prices in the voluntary market may reflect that the existing certifications are seen 
as reliable, and that the market is actually functioning.  
 
Demand and supply primarily drive the prices in both the regulatory and voluntary 
carbon markets. Distinctions in regulatory constraints, customer base and 
inclusion of forestry-based credits in the two frameworks affect prices differently.  
 
7.3 The Role of Certifications 
Certification is a requirement in compliance markets, and an increasing necessity 
in voluntary markets. Increased focus on carbon certifications, and additional 
certifications reassuring that the carbon credits purchased stem from a socially and 
environmentally responsible driven company, may be a consequence of “the rules 
of the game in the society” (North 1984). Increased focus on such aspects from 
the media, NGOs and other civil society groups possibly make certification of 
carbon forestry credits a necessity to survive in the market. The reason is that 
customers want reassurance that they purchase a quality product. Since 
individuals engaging in the markets seek to maximize their goals to obtain 
maximum benefit through sales of credits. Hence, their preferences to certify their 
credits are exogenously given. The main point of rational choice and calculus 
historical institutionalists, is that actors’ behavior are influenced by their 
expectations of other actors’ behavior (Hall and Taylor 1996).  
 
Risks of non-permanence and leakage associated with carbon forestry projects 
make sound certification of projects important. Other noteworthy factors are 
consideration of biodiversity and local population, as forestry carbon projects 
demand large areas of land. The voluntary carbon market was formerly seen as a 
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“wild west”. As Karl Polanyi (1957) wrote, a laissez-faire market approach will 
eventually lead to a demand for reintroduction of frameworks of social control. 
This shows that property rights and institutional rules are required to ensure a 
well-functioning market. Certifications are important because of the complexity 
and intangible feature of the product. The issue of information asymmetry and 
moral hazard between sellers and buyers is especially a problem in carbon 
markets. When buying CERs or VERs, you buy “the absence of invisible 
emissions”61. 
 
Historical Institutionalists’ focus on path dependence can help explaining the 
increase in certification demands. First, a regulatory carbon market was made. 
The voluntary already existed, but was by and large seen as a “wild west” of 
different credits that were not as reliable as those the regulatory framework 
offered. A result was increased focus on standards in this sector.  
 
Since GRAS’ carbon credits either are sold quite recently or are for sale, it is hard 
to prove whether the company will fulfill this goal and contribute to increased 
sustainability in the areas in which they are operating. Green Resources’ 
plantations are mainly certified by CDM, VCS and CCB standards. They state that 
third-party auditors have reviewed their plantations thirteen times, and eight of 
these evaluations are publicly available. GRAS has also had more than twenty 
socio-economic and environmental impact evaluations performed by consultants 
(Green Resources 2012). Information on why not all these reports are available is 
not given. Their public lenders, Norfund and Finnfund had consultants 
investigating the company’s business before they gave GRAS the loans. Even 
though Norfund forwarded a list of hundred points of improvement GRAS, they 
evaluate the company as “best in class” within their sector62. Nevertheless, the 
company heavily emphasizes their various carbon certifications and their 
additional standards, such as FCS, and it is clear that third-party certification is 
important in the market. They even claim that “achieving higher than market 
average carbon credit prices for CDM and around average for VCS projects, 
demonstrate the high-quality credits from our projects” (Green Resources 2012, 
33).  
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Third-party certification is important in carbon markets, as it is in other business 
sectors; to avoid that people that evaluate the projects has self-interest in the 
project. This is essential in order to secure that the quality of issued credits are 
comparable to other similar projects
63
. Despite this, a discussion has evolved 
around different project types. One reason for this is that it is easier to verify how 
many tons of CO2 that are reduced than to evaluate influence on local 
circumstances and sustainable development
64,65
. A benefit with certification is that 
these are independent actors that are responsible for their actions. This means that 
they can lose their accreditation as a validator of projects if they approve poor 
projects
66
. Hence, third-party verification leads to increased integrity of a project. 
This demand is linked to the issue of additionality and baseline.  
 
The relationship between validators and project developers can also be viewed as 
problematic and incidents show that opportunistic behavior does exist in the 
market. In 2009 the largest validator of CDM credits, SGS, got temporarily 
suspended after the board got information that the company could not prove that 
several projects were properly audited (Murray 2009). Generally, a problem 
similar to rating bureaus in the financial industry exists: namely that validators are 
dependent upon payments from the companies they verify.  
 
An issue related to VCMs is that it lacks international regulations. It is a bit more 
“buyer be aware”. With CDM you know that the product you buy has been 
through a standardized validation and verification process. A few “gourmet 
standards” have been developed in the voluntary market67. The Gold Standard, 
backed by more than eighty civil society groups, is one of them. The Gold 
Standard can be issued to CDM, JI and voluntary projects. For large-scale Gold 
Standard projects the requirements are the same as for CDM (Carbon Connect 
2013). The extension of the Gold Standard to include forestry credits may enhance 
the market.  
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A combination of public, private and hybrid governance structures work together 
to make carbon markets function. A variety of lawyers, regulators, accountants, 
auditors and project developers are involved in different processes of verifying 
e.g. CDM projects. Some voluntary standards, such as the Voluntary Carbon 
Standard, follow the same pattern. The combination of all these governance 
processes may all together lead to a governance deficit stemming from lack of 
transparency and the ability to easily get an overview of the market (Boyd, 
Boykoff and Newell 2011). Many actors in the market, in particular government 
actors, therefore execute additional revision of projects before they buy credits.    
 
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance only purchase the UN certified quotas, AAU, 
JI and CDM
68
. First and foremost, this is done because Norway needs to fulfill the 
requirements set by the Kyoto Protocol and the additional targets they set for 
themselves
69
. In addition to buying credits in the regulatory markets, the Ministry 
of Finance also checks the reputation of the companies they purchase credits from. 
This is done in order to secure the highest quality, and to avoid controversial 
projects and actors. They consult the Ministry’s Council of Ethics and NGOs 
engaged in the market
70
. Other European actors also do further investigations, 
while other countries do not. It is done to secure the actor’s reputations71.  
 
When the Norwegian Ministry of Finance wrote a contract with Green Resources 
to buy Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from one of their projects in 
Tanzania, they sent consultants and one representative from the ministry down to 
the plantation in order to take a closer look at the project 
72
. The project met the 
required standards at the time, but the ministry had to cancel the deal in 
September 2012 because Green Resources did not obtain the certification in 
time
73
. A/R CDM credits from the Kachung project was sold to the Swedish 
Energy Agency. SEA state that Kachung is a “win-win” project that is good for 
both the environment and the local population living in the surrounding area 
(Statens Energimyndighet 2012).   
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The focus on externalities in forest carbon markets leads to an increased demand 
for quality reassurance through certification arrangements. Generating carbon 
credits of high quality that includes social and environmental impacts on forestry 
projects are more costly for project developers. Research shows that offset buyers 
are increasingly cautious of what is commonly referred to as “greenwashing”74. 
Ecosystem Marketplace’s 2011 report (Peters-Stanley et al. 2011), state that 
almost all voluntary forestry credits are certified by a third party. The Voluntary 
Carbon Standard (VCS), attained by GRAS in Bukaleba, had a 54% market share 
in 2010. The standard focus on strong carbon accounting, and does not focus 
specifically on co-benefits from plantations. It does support a no-harm policy 
regarding social and environmental externalities. Naomi Swickard, referred to in 
Simonet, Bouculat and Olivera (2012, 12) confirms this:  
 
“The VCS is a carbon standard, so it does not absolutely require additional 
co-benefits, but it does require that projects looking to issue VCS credits 
identify potential negative environmental and socio-economic impacts and 
take all steps to mitigate them”. 
 
This statement fit the situation in Bukaleba
75
 where GRAS has not the Carbon 
Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standard additional to the VCS
76
. The 
Bukaleba VCS documents do not show any direct contact with the villagers in the 
process except a district council speaker and a chairman LC3 in Bukatube sub 
county (Decq and Espejo 2012). A combination of CCB and VCS is quite 
common in carbon forests where co-benefits for the rural population are proven. 
Given the long-term perspective on tree plantations and the complicated 
conditions in many rural areas with poor communities, projects that do not include 
local stakeholders have a strong possibility of failing (Boyd, Gutierrez and Chang 
2007). CCB is seen to focus more on social and environmental benefits of a 
project more than quantification of projects. Consequently, it serves as a good 
supplement to e.g. VCS or A/R CDM. The achievement of A/R CDM and CCB in 
Kachung can be seen to confirm the findings about differences in conflict and 
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CSR levels in Bukaleba and Kachung. However, a recent study found big gaps 
between the CCB Standards’ requirements and issues highlighted in project 
developers’ project design documents. This shows that “despite the 
institutionalization of requirements for facilitating e.g. procedural justice, many 
designs fail to demonstrate their adherence to the standard” (Suiseeya and Caplow 
2013, 8). Three of the projects researched in this study are projects validated for 
Green Resources.    
 
Figure 14: Standards mapping 
 
Source: Astrium Services and CEC (found in Simonet, Bouculat and Olivera (2012)) 
 
Project developers and credit buyers have different motives and emphasize 
different aspects when purchasing/developing carbon credits. Although partly 
motivated by altruism, most project developers engaged in forest carbon markets 
aim to maximize their returns. Green Resources’ state that they want to:  
 
“reinvest 100% of the carbon income in further tree planting into the African 
villages where the carbon revenues were originally generated, thereby continuing 
to provide significant employment and development.” 
       (Green Resources 2013)  
 
What is certain is that different certification standards allow for different behavior 
among project developers in the carbon forestry business. They may also manifest 
different difficulties plantation owners face with regards to conflict levels between 
companies and peasant populations.  
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A/R CDM certification is a prerequisite to operate within the compliance market. 
In the voluntary carbon market, the necessity of third-party certification has 
increased a lot. Stronger focus on socio-economic co-benefits for rural 
populations and the risk of leakage and non-permanence are the main explanations 
for the increased focus.  
 
Figure 15: Key findings and their relation to theory 
Findings Best suited theory 
Markets is created by a combination of rules and markets 
forces Neoliberalism 
Regulatory constraints hinders the forestry carbon market to 
develop 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
Constraints are exogenous of the market 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
Different views on commodification of forestry carbon 
credits rooted in historical trends and political views 
Critical 
Institutionalism/Historical 
Institutionalism 
Monitoring of carbon forests can be difficult relative to 
energy projects 
Critical institutionalism 
(gap rules vs. practice) 
Low prices due to regulatory constraints (CDM) 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
Lacking recognition of A/R CDM in EU ETS=low demand 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
National governments reluctance to include forestry is 
based on a fear of differences between rules and practice  Critical Institutionalism 
Inclusion of forestry credits in regional regulatory 
frameworks Critical Institutionalism 
Increased use of certifications in voluntary carbon markets Critical Institutionalism 
 
7.4 Carbon Forestry Projects and Socio-Economic Influence 
Green Resources’ two projects in Uganda show that carbon forest plantations can 
have noteworthy socio-economic influence on local population’s lives, both 
positively and negatively. Consequently, globally structured markets have 
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implications on a local level. Moreover, GRAS’ behavior as an organization is 
influenced by other institutional arrangements than the ones related to the 
international carbon markets.  
 
As mentioned in the first analysis section, one of the problems with carbon 
forestry projects is related to the potential of land conflicts with local populations. 
In that respect, one can critically ask if this contributes to sustainable 
development, which is one of the requirements of CDM
77
. Historical 
institutionalists have proposed that different institutional arrangements within the 
carbon forestry market allocate power disproportionately across social groups 
(Hall and Taylor 1996). Forest carbon credits, especially in the voluntary markets, 
are often criticized for their legitimacy when it comes to environmental benefits 
and treatment of peasant populations (Merger and Pistorius 2011). As an opposing 
theory to this criticism, neoliberals emphasize that living standards of the 
employed population have increased as a result of capitalist accumulation (Clarke 
2005). Moreover, the neoliberal notion promises increased democracy, and to 
protect rural population and their property rights.  
 
Trade-offs between carbon plantations and externalities differs in different 
projects, and needs to be looked at case-by-case (Simonet, Bouculat and Olivera 
2012). Projects that benefit local populations, and e.g. share carbon revenues with 
local populations and give access to firewood etc., are generally more successful 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Reynolds 2012). Despite the short period spent in Green 
Resources’ carbon plantations, it became clear that they face some challenges 
regarding the rural populations in Bukaleba. Except some reported start-up 
problems, Kachung did not show the same signs. In Bukaleba Forest Reserve 
(BFR), people felt more threatened by the company’s business78. Many villagers 
felt they were not welcome to stay by the company. This was confirmed in 
interviews conducted in Bukaleba, Nakalanga and to some extent in Walumbe. 
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The people in Walumbe were slightly more positive and emphasized that they 
wanted to cooperate with the company
79
.  
 
Green Resources’ field office close to Bukaleba village also expressed that they 
had experienced conflicts in the plantation. The senior plantation manager 
expressed that the conflict level had been at its peak between 2009 and 2012, but 
that they are “manageable bumps”. The company experienced some mass 
destruction on the plantations.  
 
“It is sometimes understandable because the people are pushed to the wall 
as the forest is taking place. They have nowhere else to go. They used the 
area as farmland, and now it is taken back to forestry. It is never easy. We 
lost about 50 hectares in a fire in 2009. In 2011 we had 40 ha cut down by 
communities”.  
       (Teddy Nsamba, 13.02.2013) 
 
The company further express that some of the problems they experience are not 
related to the villages.  
 
“Sometimes people come from the outside to make claims”.  
       (Teddy Nsamba, 13.02.2013) 
 
The difficulties GRAS faces in relation to Bukaleba may stem from geographical 
and demographical matters. While the villages in Bukaleba are placed within the 
actual forest reserve, the ones in Kachung are placed in the outskirts. Moreover, 
institutional arrangements in Uganda proved central for some of the activities that 
GRAS forbids, and that the rural population was dissatisfied with. Both forest 
reserves were defined as degraded
80
 woodlands where villagers used to cultivate 
and had animals grazing.  
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People in Kachung have access to land outside of the plantation. In Bukaleba they 
need to move far away if their animals are to graze outside of the plantation. It 
became clear during interviews with people and local politicians in Bukaleba that 
people had been asked to move from the forest reserve.  The local political leaders 
in Bukaleba claim that they do not have any problems with Green Resources per 
se. The management of Green Resources express that they do not engage in 
involuntary displacement of people:  
 
“One of our policies is that we do not encourage, and don’t get involved in 
involuntary displacement of people”  
(Isaac Kapalaga, 13.02.2013)  
 
However, I got the impression that there had been some conflicts over land in the 
plantation. Local politicians stated that people first:  
 
“…Were chased out of this place…there is a lot pressure from the 
community, but we told them that this place is not yours. It was for the 
government, and the government decided to give it to the BFC. So they 
went on and slowly started listening. BFC is giving something, like the 
service delivery and health center support…they also allowed some 
intercropping…some still grow crops in the forest.”  
(Interview with Sajjabi Aggry, referring to the former situation in Bukaleba. 
11.02.2013).   
 
BFC has in Bukaleba approached local politicians to influence people to move
81
. 
This is confirmed during the interview with the head mistress in Bukaleba:  
 
“For the community they promised some packages as they send them 
away. We don’t know when, but they promised…you get money and go.”  
        (Interview 12.02.2013) 
 
This movement of people is according to GRAS happening on a voluntary basis.  
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It seems like communication problems was the main challenge in the beginning 
when the company entered the forest reserve. Because of a cattle farm set up 
during Idi Amin’s rule, people had moved into the reserve in the seventies82. 
Others had come later. Nevertheless, the result is that many of the villagers have 
been living their whole lives in the reserve. When a company enters with 
insufficient information they will meet problems. No one gave the impression that 
the company forced people out of Bukaleba, but the plantation business does seem 
to jeopardize the people’s sustenance within the forest reserve. Critical 
institutionalists view markets and their preconditions as heterogeneous (Lesorogol 
2010). This is definitely the case in GR’s Uganda operations. Even though 
unintended, the business has to some extent influenced people’s lives in one of 
their plantations negatively.  
 
Despite a few issues in the start up, none of the respondents in Kachung gave us 
the impression that the company’s activities intrude on their daily lives and 
threaten their livelihoods. Most of the respondents described the situation as good, 
and people generally appreciate what the company is doing. One of the 
Storekeepers at LFC told us that:  
 
“So far there are not any conflicts. Only in the beginning when they where 
opening this land for the forest plantation…there was this scenario of 
evicting people in the plantation because they were cultivating in the 
plantation…and grazing. But these days the problem is no longer there.” 
        (Interview 15.02.2013) 
 
Two headmen working in Kachung further verify this:  
 
“The relationship is good…very good…we appreciate what the company 
is doing. The company has constructed a health unit. And they are 
protecting spring water….and provided seedlings for free. It’s done 
through the local leaders. We have a community development officer, who 
is in charge of all these programs.”  
        (Interview 15.02.2013) 
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One of LFC’s field supervisors further confirms a change in the situation in 
Kachung and that the relationship is good:  
 
“You see, this place was owned by the government. Most of the area was 
not planted, so the communities around used to graze their animals within 
the area, and they used to cultivate, even though they where not supposed 
to. But they where not residing. So they thought it would be like that 
forever, they did not think the government would give it to other people to 
do the planting of the trees. So their attitude was that they could use it for 
the grazing of their animals, digging, cultivating. So when they tried to 
make them stop they thought they where being chased away from the area, 
which was already a government land in fact, gazetted by the government. 
So later they learned, they where talked to, they mobilized the 
communities, talked to them and they came to understand. That's why they 
are now friendly.” 
        (Interview 16.02.2013) 
 
Despite the positive influence respondents stated that GRAS’ activities give, a few 
respondents in Kachung emphasize that certain aspects of their lives has become 
more difficult. One of the issues they emphasize is lack of places to graze their 
animals. The Australian researcher Kirsten Lyons (2012) found that people in 
Kachung felt that they were “squeezed” off the land because of the trees. 
However, the people in Bukaleba were generally more negative, did not see many 
benefits from the company and felt threatened by their activities. Although 
pinpointing a few negative side effects not directly related to the company’s 
business, many respondents in Kachung underlined benefits LFC had brought 
with them:  
 
“We have seen the benefits. The income improves the standard of living 
for the people. There is always monthly income from the plantation work. 
There is also a negative side of it because workers only concentrate on the 
plantation work, abandoning their own work, like food crop production. So 
at time it also leads to famine…”  
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He further explained that the lack of own cultivation did not stem from the fact 
that land was taken away. This seemed not to be a problem in Kachung:  
 
“I would say the relationship is good. Cause the people living here work 
here. According to me the existence of this company has even improved 
the people’s livelihood.” 
      (Storekeeper Kachung, 15.02.2013) 
 
The impression given by the company’s workers was confirmed in the villages 
surrounding Kachung:  
 
“The community wanted to know why the company was coming to plant 
trees without notifying the community around…and that was caused the 
conflict, cause they where not aware…The relationship with the company 
is good now because they has been giving some facilities to the 
community, like a health center, seedling and wells.”  
 
“The most difficult situation is that we are not allowed to take our cattle to 
graze in the forest.” 
      (Vice LC1 Apeti’a Village, 16.02.2013) 
 
Viewing the differences between the two plantations and the problems Green 
Resources and the rural populations face, it becomes clear that carbon forestry 
projects can lead to land conflicts with local populations
83
. This finding is related 
to issues of property rights where a right to conduct certain activities in certain 
areas may provoke conflicts. It also shows that carbon forestry projects can 
contribute to sustainable development in line with neoliberal argumentation. 
Neoliberals emphasize that a consequence of capitalist accumulation, such as the 
one we see in forest carbon markets, is increased living standards of the employed 
population (Clarke 2005). Historical institutionalists have suggested that some 
institutional arrangements within forestry carbon markets allocate power 
disproportionately across different social groups. This is also evident in the 
                                                 
83
 Anne Kari Garberg, FIVH, also confirms the conflict in Bukaleba. She did 
many of the same observations as I did during her visits to the plantation. 
Additionally, Dr. Kirsten Lyons from the University of Queensland writes about 
negative impact in both plantations.  
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plantations, and both theories can be seen to complement each other in this 
context. What effect a project gives depends on companies’ approaches and 
practices. Demography of an area and community development activities may also 
influence level of conflict in carbon forestry projects.  
 
7.4.1 Community Development 
Green Resources state that they contribute to socio-economic development by 
providing employment in the regions they operate. Moreover, they engage in 
various community development activities, such as education of girls, 
construction of maternity wards, HIV/AIDS sensitivity programs, seedling 
provision and tree planting education to communities
84
. They promise more 
development as the company starts to earn money: 
  
“We are committed to spend 10% of our carbon revenue to our community 
development activities. Currently, we try to implement community 
activities; tree planting, health activities, maintenance of community 
roads…people have free access to our plantations to pick firewood for 
cooking. Some of them go ahead and even cut firewood for sale… ” 
 (Isaac Kapalaga, 13.02.20313) 
 
GRAS’ also emphasize that community development is prioritized even though 
the company has scarce financial resources  
 
“Even when we don’t have money to pay salaries, I save a few thousand 
dollars for medical supplies to the health center, which most of our 
workers and the communities use.”  
(Isaac Kapalaga, 13.02.2013)  
 
The statement may imply that GRAS prioritizes some of their community 
activities before paying their workers
85
. A local nurse at the GRAS’ and Norad-
financed health clinic in Nkombe Village support this statement and says they 
regularly get medical supplies. Although GRAS has a community development 
                                                 
84
 Apili Stella Maris, Teddy Nsamba and Isaac Kapalaga, GRAS 
85
 The worker that had quitted his job at GRAS said that he somtimes got his wage 
later than agreed upon in his contract.  
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program and heavily promote this at their webpage and other company material, 
villagers in Bukaleba forest reserve claim the benefits are lacking, and leaves an 
impression that they feel more threatened than benefitted by the company’s 
activities
86. The company’s development officers seem to have been more 
successful in promoting the various initiatives the company has taken. This 
achievement may be explained by the size of the area, which is one-fourth of 
Bukaleba, in addition to the fact that none of the villages are placed within the 
central forest reserve
87
.   
 
Carbon forestry projects are found to have both positive and negative socio-
economic influences on local populations. There are indications that GRAS’ work 
in Bukaleba impacts peasant populations negatively, mainly due to lack of land 
for cultivation. The impression is better in Kachung, where it seems like their 
activities have contributed to increased living standards. The company does work 
to improve the relationship with the local people both places and the situation may 
change. However, it is important to keep in mind that the world is experienced 
with “different eyes” depending on where one belongs in a social hierarchy.  
 
Figure 16: Summary of factors that possibly influence conflict levels in the CFRs 
  Kachung Bukaleba 
Villages are placed 
Outside the 
CFR Inside the CFR 
Reported conflicts between villages No Yes 
Political interference 
Not 
reported Reported during election periods 
Allowance of gracing in CFR No No 
Allowance of cropping between the 
plantation trees No No 
Construction of health facilities  Yes Yes 
Participation in the tree planting 
programme Yes Yes 
Road maintenance Yes 
Yes, but in poor condition during 
our field trip  
Water access 
Yes, in five 
villages 
Yes, renovation of an old one 
and to boreholes 
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 LC1 Nakalanga, Aldon Walumkamba, Uganda Radio Network, and other 
participants at the interview sessions in the three villages in the Bukaleba 
plantation.  
87
 Villagers in Kachung, in addition to workers of the company state that they 
benefit from the community development programs GRAS have set up in their 
communities.  
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7.5 Local Institutional Arrangements and their Influence on Carbon 
Forestry Projects 
International rules and government regulations frame how businesses in carbon 
markets operate. Moreover, informal host country and sponsor preferences also 
shape a projects outcome and behavior. A gap often exists between abstract rules 
and concrete actions. In North’s new institutional theory, rules exist to exclude 
outsiders and regulate use of resources. Uganda’s Central Forest Reserves (CFRs) 
are set up with a legal framework that excludes people from living, cultivating and 
breeding grazing animals in the areas. This is written in Uganda’s Forestry Act88. 
The first ones were set aside for forestry during British rule in 1932
89
. Green 
Resources operate under these preconditions and hence follow the law
90. GRAS’ 
license in Uganda is for a period of 49 years because the country has a policy not 
to give foreigners longer agreements. NFA is the body that hands out and 
authorizes these agreements
91
, and lease land to private investors at a cost between 
6,600 and 22,300 USX (or between 2,6 and 8,7 USD) per hectare per year. The 
agreement is revised every year, and currently GR pays 6,600 USX per hectare 
per year in Kachung. In Bukaleba they pay 9900 USX per hectare per year
92
. 
Payments depend on distance from Kampala, where you come from and what 
species you plant
93
.  
 
Political risks related to land areas in Uganda, such as CFRs are based in the fact 
that people have moved into the reserves even though they were not intended to in 
the first place
94
.  The local people are aware that the land they live off is 
government land gazetted for forestry:  
 
 
                                                 
88
 Jimmy Ouna, NFA 
89
 Kabi Maxwell, NFA 
90
 Teddy Nsamba, GRAS 
91
 Isaac Kapalaga, GRAS and Pathias Karekona, Uganda Broadcasting 
Corporation 
92
 Teddy Nsamba 
93
 Interview with Land Management Specialist at NFA, Rashid Ssekitto. 
94
 Ivar Jørgensen, Norad 
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“In Bukaleba, there previously was a farm for animals…I think it stopped 
being active in the early ‘80s…Then NFA took back its land and gave it to 
Busoga Forestry Company.”  
       (Sajjabi Aggry, 11.02.2013)  
 
NFA define “encroachment” as cultivation, settlements and grazing within forest 
reserves. It is NFA’s responsibility to make sure that the CFRs are free from such 
activities. This is almost impossible due to high encroachment levels and politics 
in the country that contradicts the mandate NFA is given
95
. A report prepared by 
NFA shows almost 50% illegal settlement in Bukaleba, and 10% in Kachung
96
. 
Because of the settlement in the plantations, GRAS divides their plantations into 
different zones. They try to plant on parts of the area that are not inhabited by 
local populations first
97
.  
 
Steinmo (2008) emphasizes the role institutions play in shaping behavior. Further, 
a titleholder of the property rights, in this case GRAS, has the right to manage the 
area according to the company’s wishes within the legal framework. People in 
both Kachung and Bukaleba mentioned that some of their biggest challenges with 
the company’s business were the prohibition of having animals grazing and 
cropping in the forest reserves
98
. NFA and SPGS, the latter who support GRAS 
financially, prohibit these forms of activities in their guidelines.  
 
“SPGS follow the guidelines from NFA as well, and one of them is no 
grazing in the plantations.“ 
        (Charles Odeke, 21.02.2013) 
 
The close link between regulations and externalities may explain some of the 
restraints NFA put on forest reserves. NFA’s mandate is to protect the national 
forests, and they have leased out land to GRAS in order to achieve this goal. A 
main point with externalities is that they do not directly affect the decision maker 
(Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962). GRAS’ activities contribute to lower pressure 
on deforestation of natural forests in the region, but have some unwanted side 
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 Jimmy Ouna, NFA 
96
 I was not allowed to attach this document in my thesis. 
97
 Ivar Jørgensen, Norad 
98
 Someone in all villages both in Kachung and Bukaleba mentioned this.   
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effects. In fact, the plantation contributes to multiple externalities; monoculture, 
decreased access to natural resources for the local population and fires. Incidents 
of fire release much CO
2 
into the atmosphere, and
 
are one of the risks directly 
related to the legitimacy of sold carbon credits. Evidence found supports that the 
company has experienced some cases of fire
99
:  
 
“An intended forest fire happened once…because they promised to give 
community land…”  
(Worker 32, 12.02.2013)  
 
At the same time it may contribute to uphold biodiversity in other areas outside 
the plantations, and protects the shorelines of Lake Victoria and the wetlands in 
Dokolo District from erosion
100
.   
 
Environmental problems, such as deforestation and degradation of woodland, are 
related to overexploitation of public goods and stem from incompletely defined 
property rights (Libecap 2008). To add on that, it may also stem from lack of 
resources to enforce the law. Although Green Resources is running and owning 
the plantation, they do not own the land. NFA as the owner of CFRs is responsible 
for removal of encroachers
101
. This does not mean that it is right for GRAS to 
disclaim their responsibility in relation to the issues they face with the peasant 
populations. It is easy for the company to make referrals to NFA etc. when these 
problems are addressed
102
. Land pressure and illegal activities in the plantations 
are mentioned to be the second largest challenge the company face
103
. One of the 
illegal activities is related to a NGO called Arise Africa. They have built a school 
on a large piece of the land that is licensed to GRAS
104
. Moreover, the settlements 
within Bukaleba Forest Reserve are by legal definition illegal. Whether or not one 
should do something with the illegal settlement is a question of where human 
                                                 
99
 Incidents of fire are also experienced in the other countries where GRAS 
operate.  
100
 Rajab Epilla, Dokolo District Environmental Office 
101
 Jimmy Ouna, NFA 
102
 Anne Kari Garberg, FIVH 
103
 Isaac Kapalaga, GRAS 
104
 Pathias Karekona, Uganda Broadcasting Association and Isaac Kapalaga, 
GRAS 
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rights start. Is it ok to remove people who have been living in an area for thirty 
years?  
 
Blurring boundaries and blending of formal logics between rules in carbon 
markets and local rules make GRAS’ work in Uganda difficult. GRAS behave in 
accordance to regulations and laws set by governmental agencies when denying 
activities such as grazing and cropping between their trees. At the same time, they 
try to comply with international rules set by governments and other actors in 
carbon markets. It is not possible to conclude whether or not the company would 
have followed the same practice without these rules. Nevertheless, rules made by 
governments and followed by GRAS influence conflict levels in Kachung and 
Bukaleba, although the level of conflicts also is influenced by other factors. This 
shows that carbon forestry in practice is highly influenced by societal structures, 
norms and practices. Critical institutionalists emphasize that institutional 
functioning may produce social inclusion or exclusion.  
 
Both national and international regulations influence carbon forestry projects on 
the ground. Some of these regulations seem to be in conflict because of 
conflicting goals.  
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8.0 Conclusion  
Forestry carbon markets face many challenges, such as plummeting carbon prices, 
especially in the compliance market. This shows that the present institutionalizing 
of the market has been slightly unsuccessful. It also shows that there is a need for 
a revision of the international regulations laying the foundation for the market. 
The challenges the CDM market face with regards to forestry is related to 
restrictions on type of forestry projects and rigid monitoring systems, making A/R 
CDM the most difficult projects to implement for project developers. Because of 
the less rigid international monitoring, voluntary carbon markets with focus on 
forestry have been a far greater success. The voluntary market’s failures have 
been pointed out by a variety of groups in the international civil society. A result 
is increased focus on third-party certifications of carbon forestry projects. 
Moreover, different incentives among actors in the two markets drive the markets 
forward along slightly different paths, and explain why the voluntary has 
succeeded.  
 
Creation of carbon markets affect people at all levels in society, and success is 
relative to how it is measured. Green Resources as a case shows that forestry 
credits are attractive in the market. Their compliance to market demands of 
certifications may partly explain this. However, their projects do not only 
represent a “sunshine story”. Conflicts between the company and local 
communities, in line with arguments against carbon forestry inclusion into the 
regulatory carbon market, are present in their Bukaleba plantation
105
. Ambiguities 
about sustainable development from their carbon projects are evident. There is 
room for improvement at several points, and it would be interesting to conduct 
further investigations of GRAS and other similar actors in the market when their 
revenue streams starts flowing.  
 
Carbon markets are still under construction and are far from perfect, and the 
knowledge one obtains reviewing the markets can be used to form the future 
market regulation. None of the theories presented in the thesis can alone explain 
the functioning and outcomes of carbon markets. This implies that neither 
institutional, nor neoliberal theories alone can explain the process of developing a 
                                                 
105
 There are ambiguities about their plantation in Kachung as well, but it seems to 
run more ”smoothly” than GRAS’ operation in Bukaleba.  
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market. However, the limitation of this study implies that this statement needs 
further investigation. 
 
 
 
International market regulations influence local conditions: the picture is taken of 
a local person walking among the plantation trees 
 
        (Private photo, Kachung) 
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10.0 Appendices 
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN UGANDA 
 
Interview 1. Kampala. Pathias Karekona. Journalist, Uganda Broadcasting 
Association. 09.02.2013.  
 
Interview 2. Bukaleba. Health Center Nurse at a facility close to the Bukaleba 
Plantation. Sponsored by Green Resources in cooperation with Norad. 
11.02.2013. 
 
Interview 3. Bukaleba. Health Center Founding Member. 11.02.2013.  
 
Interview 4. Walumbe Village. Town Council. 11.02.2013.  
 
Interview 5. Bukaleba. Mudbu Gumbaya Albert. Local Chairman 2. 11.02.2013.  
 
Interview 6. Bukaleba. Sajjab Aggry. Parish Chief neighboring parish. 
11.02.2013.  
 
Interview 7. Nakalanga Village.. Town Council including the Local Chief.  
11.02.2013.  
 
Interview 8. Bukaleba. Two representatives from Bukatobe Safe Firewood. Local 
NGO engaged in environment and fruit tree planting. 11.02.2013 
 
Interview 9. Bukaleba Village in Bukaleba Forest Reserve. Head mistress at the 
school.12.02.2013. 
 
Interview 10. Bukaleba Village. Worker 32 years old (slasher
106
) for Green 
Resources’ Busoga Forestry Company. 12.02.2013.  
 
                                                 
106
 Slashers are the workers that clear areas between the trees and that clear areas 
for vegetation that hinders planting of trees.  
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Interview 11. Bukaleba Village. Worker 51 years old. Guard for GR BFC. 
12.02.2013.  
 
Interview 12. Bukaleba Village and around the plantation. Former employee at 
BFC. 12.02.2013.  
 
Interview 13. Bukaleba Village. Foreman for BFC. 12.02.2013.  
 
Interview 14. Mayuge District. Environmental office. 12.02.2013. 
 
Interview 15. Mayuge District. District Planner’s Office. 13.02.2013. 
 
Interview 16. Bukaleba, BFC Field Office. Teddy Nsamba. Senior Forest 
Manager, BFC. 13.02.2013. 
 
Interview 17. Jinja. Isaac Kapalaga. Managing Director Green Resources Uganda. 
13.02.2013. 
 
Interview 18. Kachung Field Office. Group of workers for Lango Forestry 
Company. 15.02.2013. 
 
Interview 19. Dokolo District. Rajab Epilla. District Environment and Natural 
Resources Officer. 15.02.2013. 
 
Interview 20. Lira. Apili Stella Maris. Plantation Manager LFC. 15.02.2013. 
 
Interview 21. Kachung. Teacher at a local school. 16.02.2013.  
 
Interview 22. Kachung. Villagers. 16.02.2013. 
 
Interview 23. Booster Agengi Village. Worker for the local water company. 
16.02.2013. 
 
Interview 24. Booster Agengi Village. Supervisor LFC. 16.02.2013.  
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Interview 25. Booster Agengi Village. 3 Casual workers LFC. 16.02.2013. 
 
Interview 26. Abenyonya’b Village. Town Council including ex-worker, Village 
Chief and other locals. 16.02.2013.  
 
Interview 27. Apetita Village. Village Council including Chairman, Vice 
Chairman and other locals. 16.02.2013. 
 
Interview 28. Kampala. Kabi Maxwell. Forest Utilization Specialist, National 
Forestry Authority (NFA). 19.02.2013.  
 
Interview 29. Kampala. Rashid Ssekitto. Land Management Specialist, NFA. 
19.02.2013.  
 
Interview 30. Kampala. Kristin T. Wæringsaasen, Energy Counsellor, and Mary 
Mabweijano, Senior Programme Officer at the Royal Norwegian Embassy. 
20.02.2013.  
 
Interview 31. Charlie Langan. Forestry Carbon Consultant, Uganda Carbon 
Bureau. 20.02.2013.  
 
Interview 32. Kampala. Charles Odeke. Plantation Officer, Sawlog Production 
Grant Scheme. 21.02.2013.  
 
Interview 33. Kampala. Jimmy Ouna. Encroachment Prevention Specialist, NFA. 
28.02.2013. 
 
Interview 34. Kampala. Patrick Byagaba. Researcher/Lecturer, Makerere 
University, School of Forestry, Environmental and Geographical Science. 
01.03.2013.  
 
Interview 35. Kampala. Xavier Nyindo Mugumya. Coordinator Climate Change, 
NFA.  
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN NORWAY 
 
Interview 1. Oslo. Helle Biseth. Senior Advisor. The Department of Climate, 
Energy and Environment. Norad. 11.03.2013. 
 
Interview 2. Oslo. Anne Kari Garberg. Journalist and Researcher. The Department 
of Ethics, Trade and Industry, Future of Our Hands (FIVH).  14.03.2013.  
 
Interview 3. Oslo. Sigurd Klakeg. Deputy Director General. Economic Policy 
Department, The Ministry of Finance Norway. 14.03.2013.  
 
Interview 4. Oslo. Elin Ersdal. Head of Department Industrial Partnerships. 
Norfund. 14.03.3013.  
 
Interview 5. Oslo. Tim Ivar Bernhard Lund. Senior Sustainability Advisor, 
Norfund. 15.03.2013.  
 
Interview 6. Oslo. Brita Næss. Senior Advisor, The Department of Economic 
Development, Energy, Gender and Governance, Section for Private Sector 
Development, Norad. 15.03.2013.  
 
Interview 7. Oslo. Ivar Jørgensen. Profession Director, The Department for 
Climate, Energy and Environment. Norad.  19.03.2013.  
 
Interview 8. Oslo. Arild Angelsen. Professor in Development and Environmental 
Economics, the Department of Economics and Resource Management, University 
of Life Sciences. 02.04.2013.  
 
Interview 9. Asbjørn Torvanger. Senior Research Fellow, Center for International 
Climate and Environmental Research. 04.04.2013.   
 
Interview 10. Bergen. Endre Tvinnereim. Researcher II, Faculty of Social 
Sciences (Rokkansenteret), University of Bergen. 05.04.2013.  
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Interview 11. Oslo. Liv Røhnebæk Bjergene. Former journalist, Bistandsaktuelt 
(now employed at Faktotum Informasjon AS). 09.04.2013.  
 
Interview 12. Oslo. Peer Stiansen. Senior Advisor and CDM Executive Board 
Member . Department of Climate. 11.04.2013.  
 
Interview 13. Ås. Karl Solberg. One of the founders of Norwegian Afforestation 
Group
107
. 06.06.2013. 
 
Interview 14. Oslo. Frank Melum. Senior Analyst, Point Carbon. 20.06.2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107
 Norwegian Afforestation Group leased the area where Kachung forest is today 
and started planting trees. Green Resources bought this company in 2007. 
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE VILLAGES 
1. How long have you been living in this area? 
2. Do you work for Green Resources? 
3. Do many in this village work for GRAS? 
4. How is your relationship to the company? 
5. How do you view your future if you stay in this area? 
6. How has the GRAS’ presence affected your access to natural resources? 
7. Has the relationship gotten better/worse during the last years? Why? 
8. How is the communication between GRAS and the village? 
9. Does GRAS approach key persons in your village to inform you about 
their business and its development? 
10. Have you ever met someone from the management of the company? 
11. Has GRAS’ existence in the forest reserve affected your life in any way? 
12. Has GRAS informed you about the benefits and negative consequences 
their business has on your lives? 
13. Has GRAS promised the communities any future benefits? What have they 
done for the villages so far? 
14. Do you know about their carbon projects? 
15. Has the company explained the benefits of plantations in the area? 
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APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PLANTATION WORKERS GRAS 
1. What is your position in the company? 
2. How long have you been working for the company? 
3. Are you from this area? 
4. What kind of education do you have? 
5. Are there any opportunities for promotion within the company? 
6. Does GRAS offer any education programs for their workers? 
7. Do you like working for GRAS? 
8. How is your salary? 
9. Can you tell me about your normal working day? 
10. How many hours do you work every day? 
11. How many days do you work every week? 
12. Do you get any form for transportation from the company? 
13. Do you get any pension benefits when you retire? 
14. Are any of the workers organized in unions? 
15. Do you get the equipment you need for your work from the company? 
16. Do you have a written company? 
17. Do your colleagues have contracts? 
18. How is the communication between you and the management? 
19. Have you ever met anyone from the London office? 
20. How would you describe the relationship between the company and the 
villages? 
21. Is working for GRAS viewed as a good job? Is it socially accepted? 
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APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW WITH GRAS’ MANAGEMENT IN UGANDA 
1. How is the relationship between the company and the villages? 
2. What have you done so far in terms of support to the villages? 
3. How important is the community activities/support you provide? 
4. How do you evaluate the wage level you operate with?  
5. How do you decide the wage level? 
6. How do you choose whom to employ? 
7. What is the company’s biggest challenge in Uganda? 
8. Do you have any plans on expanding the business in the country? 
9. How did you acquire the forest reserves? 
10. How long is the lease? 
11. Can you tell me about your different business operations? 
12. More specifically, can you tell me about the carbon certification process? 
13. Why do you engage in both the voluntary and compliance market in 
Uganda? 
14. With regards to your carbon projects, what is the difference between 
Kachung and Bukaleba? 
15. What species to you plant, and why? 
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APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEW GUIDE NFA/SPGS/MAKERERE UNIVERISTY 
1. History on forestry in Uganda. 
2. Why are plantations important for the country?  
3. What benefits do they provide? 
4. How is the focus on climate change in the country? 
5. Do you know anything about carbon forestry projects? 
6. What is the history of such projects in Uganda? 
7. How many carbon forestry projects do you have in the country? 
8. Can you tell me about the process of CDM and REDD in the country? 
9. How is the process where NFA give licenses of land to foreign investors? 
10. How did you evaluate GRAS in this process? 
11. What is the land rent in a plantation project in the country? 
12. What are the typical challenges forestry companies faces in Uganda? 
13. Plantations in Uganda are mostly monocultures, what risks do 
monocultures impose on the environment? Do they provide any benefits? 
14. What do you know about GRAS’ projects in Kachung and Bukaleba? 
15. GRAS has experienced some trouble with the local populations, especially 
in Bukaleba. What do you know about this? 
16. Why do you support GRAS’ work? 
17. How much have you supported their plantations with? 
18. What are the potential risks in allowing foreign investor into the Uganda? 
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APPENDIX 7: INTERVIEW GUIDE RESEARCHERS 
1. Why are intermediates, such as brokers, used in voluntary carbon trade? Is 
it necessary? 
2. What are the problems voluntary carbon markets faces?  
3. Are there any specific problems related to carbon forestry projects in 
voluntary carbon markets? 
4. Is third-party certification of carbon credits common in the voluntary 
carbon markets? How is the quality of these? 
5. How long is the process in getting third party certifications in the 
voluntary market? 
6. Why is certification important in the voluntary market? Are there any 
problems with this certification? 
7. How can certifications and achievements of standards lead to credibility 
and accept in the market? 
8. Do carbon forestry projects normally have more than one certification to 
cover social, environmental and economic aspects? 
9. Which hinders exist in carbon markets for CDM and voluntary carbon 
credits generated from forestry projects? 
10. What influences the carbon prices? Why is CDM currently cheaper than 
voluntary market credits?  
11. What are the problems with temporary forestry carbon credits? Why are 
these temporary? 
12. What are the problems with CDM? 
13. Why have so few forestry projects chosen to try to get CDM certification? 
14. How does the sales- and purchase process function? Are there differences 
between regulatory and voluntary carbon markets? 
15. What kind of motives exists among the markets’ customers? What about 
the providers of credits? 
16. Do you know Green Resources? 
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APPENDIX 8: INTERVIEW GUIDE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENTAL 
MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES 
Norad/Norfund 
1. What kind of projects to you fund? Do you have a specific focus on 
forestry? 
2. How do you evaluate the projects you fund? 
3. How do you evaluate GRAS? 
4. How do you evaluate GRAS work in Uganda? What is different in their 
operations in Uganda in comparison to the ones in Tanzania and 
Mozambique? 
5. How do you view their carbon business? 
6. Do you consult NGOs focusing on relevant fields when during 
evaluations?  
7. What happens if a company you fund stop following your requirements? 
Do you give any sanctions? 
8. When a company/project you fund does not fulfill your requirements, what 
do you do? 
9. Why are Norway engaged in carbon forest activities? 
 
Ministry of Finance 
1. How do you evaluate carbon projects when you purchase carbon credits? 
2. Can you describe the process when you signed the contract with GRAS? 
3. Why did you choose to purchase their credits? 
4. Why did you go back on the contact? What happened? 
5. Do you consult NGOs or other sources focusing on relevant fields when 
during evaluations?  
6. Do you purchase any carbon credits in voluntary markets? Why/why not? 
7. Do other governments purchase voluntary credits? 
8. Do other public actors in Norway buy voluntary carbon credits?  
9. What influence the prices in the market? 
10. What role do certifications have? 
11. How do you view the future of carbon markets? 
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APPENDIX 9: THE CDM PROJECT CYCLE
108
 
 
1. Project participants are investors and implementers from industrialized and 
developing countries. They:  
- Design and implement the project. 
- Present the monitoring plan including measurement, baseline 
construction and leakage evaluation. 
 
2. Operational Entities: legal entities accredited by the CDM Executive 
Board in Bonn, Germany: 
- Validate the proposed CDM activities  
- Verify and certify the emission reductions/removals in accordance 
with the monitoring plan. 
 
3. CDM Executive Board:  Composed of ten members designated by and 
under the authority of the Conference of Parties (COP), six of them 
coming from developing countries.  
- Approves methodologies and definition of project limits. 
- Determines accreditation of operational entities. 
- Registers the certified project. 
- Issues CERs with a unique serial number to the project participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
108
 Source: FAO http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/ac836e/AC836E06.htm, 24.07.13 
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APPENDIX 10: CDM PROJECT CYCLE MODEL
109
  
-  
 
                                                 
109
 Source: Carbon Offset Research and Education (CORE): How to Implement 
Offset Projects: http://www.co2offsetresearch.org/consumer/ProjectCycle.html, 
access date 24.07.13 
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APPENDIX 11: THE VCS PROJECT CYCLE
110
 
 
1. Choose a methodology 
- This can be an existing VCS methodology or one developed under an 
approved GHG program such as CDM.  
- If an applicable methodology does not exist, project developers are 
welcome to propose their own.  
 
2. Describe and list project 
- Project developers must open an account with a VCS registry and 
submit a project description for listing on the VCS Project Pipeline. 
 
3. Validate Project Description 
- A project gets listed on the project pipeline. 
- Develop a complete project description using the VCS template 
- Have the project validated by an approved validation/verification body 
(VVB) (for example Det Norske Veritas (DNV)).  
- The PD can be developed before, during or after project design and 
implementation.  
 
4. Verify Emission Reductions 
- After a project starts, project proponents monitor and measure GHG 
emission reductions or removals.  
- Information for a given monitoring period is documented in a 
monitoring report.  
- The monitoring report must be verified by an approved VVB. 
 
5. Register Project and Issue VCUs 
- Projects open an account where they submit all required documents to 
a VCS registry operator in order to be registered on the VCS Project 
Database and request issuance of VCUs.  
                                                 
110
 Source: Voluntary Carbon Standard – Develop a Project: http://www.v-c-
s.org/develop-project  / The VCS Project Cycle: Step-by-Step: http://v-c-
s.org/sites/v-c-
s.org/files/FactSheet%20PROJECT%20CYCLE%202013%20FINAL.pdf, 
24.07.13. 
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- Projects can register before or after validation. 
- All project information is listed publicly when projects are registered 
and VCUs issued.  
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APPENDIX 12: THE VCS AND CCB PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS
111
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 Source: VCS and CCB, 2012. 
GRA 19003 - Master Thesis  02.09.2013 
Page 127 
APPENDIX 12: HISTORICAL POPULATION GROWTH IN UGANDA 1948 – 
2002 
Source: UBOS 2007 
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APPENDIX 13: MAP OVER BUKALEBA FOREST RESERVE 
Source: VCS Project Description for Green Resources’ Bukaleba Forest Reserve 
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APPENDIX 14: MAP SHOWING THE VCS ELIGIBLE AREA 
 
Source: VCS Project Description for Green Resources’ Bukaleba Forest Reserve 
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APPENDIX 15: MAP OVER KACHUNG FOREST RESERVE 
 
Source: CCB Standards Project Design Document for Kachung 
(https://s3.amazonaws.com/CCBA/Projects/Kachung_Forest_Project_Afforestatio
n_on_Degraded_Lands/KFP_CCBA_PDD_Version_4.pdf) 
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APPENDIX 16: MAP OF THE KACHUNG FOREST PROJECT AREA 
SHOWING CDM ELIGBLE AREAS 
 
Source: Source: CCB Standards Project Design Document for Kachung 
(https://s3.amazonaws.com/CCBA/Projects/Kachung_Forest_Project_Afforestatio
n_on_Degraded_Lands/KFP_CCBA_PDD_Version_4.pdf) 
 
 
 
 
